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The investment company industry was surprised and alarmed to
learn from the Second Circuit in Rosenfeld v. Black1 that mutual fund
investment advisers may not profit from the transfer of the management
of a mutual fund. Advisers generally organize, promote, and, through
the control of the proxy machinery, control the funds they manage.
Consequently, some members of the industry regarded funds as belong-
ing to their respective advisers, and, in effect, permitted those advisers
to transfer freely their advisory relationship for whatever price the
market would bear. This feeling had support in sales of adviser corpora-
tion stock at substantial amounts over book value and at very high
price-to-earnings ratios. Rosenfeld laid to rest this popular notion and
specifically held that an adviser cannot be paid for the use of its
influence, the proxy machinery, or its fiduciary position in effectuating
the selection and appointment of a successor adviser. But Rosenfeld
has potentially greater implications. Read in its broadest sense, the
decision could be interpreted as an attempt to prohibit completely
the realization of reward for the entrepreneurial risk taken by an
investment adviser.
In American corporate enterprise, entrepreneurial risk is rewarded
in the form of capital appreciation in the worth of corporate shares.
These shares represent an ownership interest in the entrepreneur's
business venture. Entrepreneurs often acquire this ownership interest
in their enterprise at a cost lower than that paid by their capitalist
counterparts who invest the initial seed money.2 For example, by
1 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
2 Seed money investors are sometimes considered entrepreneurs. Throughout this arti-
cle, however, the economic distinction between an entrepreneur and a capitalist is observed.
Of course, in any one instance a promoter may be serving in both capacities. In reference
to reward for entrepreneurial risk, the reader should keep in mind the distinction between
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issuance of "cheap stock," entrepreneurs share in the success of their
efforts without large initial capital outlays. Mutual funds, however, by
their very nature, cannot properly offer a similar opportunity to their
organizers and sponsors. The funds stand ready to redeem or repurchase
their own shares upon the demand of the owner at the net asset value
of the owner's share. The issuance of cheap stock would have the effect
of reallocating proportionate equitable ownership and diminishing
the net asset value of the public shareholders' interest. This would
theoretically occur in all corporations, of course, but shareholders of
industrial companies, whose shares are traded in a secondary market
and are not callable at the option of the owner, do not generally experi-
ence an immediate market devaluation of their holdings. In corpora-
tions which are operating concerns, the liquidation or net asset value
of each share is not a major market consideration. Mutual fund shares
are not traded in a secondary market, however, and their value is
always directly related to the market value of the fund's portfolio. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits cheap stock in mutual
funds partially for this reason.3 This aspect of mutual funds, which
denies sponsors an inexpensive equity interest, has been a major factor
in the emergence of mutual funds as the predominant form of invest-
ment company.
Abuses of control abounded in the investment company industry
prior to the enactment of the 1940 legislation.4 The mutual fund
an entrepreneur's profit and a capitalist's interest, however uncertain the rate of return.
See generally J. SCHUnPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (R. Opie transl.
1934); Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. Ray., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113,
116-18.
8 No mutual fund shares may be sold at less than the "current public offering price"
described in a prospectus. The baseline of that price must be the "current net asset value"
of the fund. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 22(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a)(1) (1970)
[hereinafter cited as "the 1940 Act" or "the Act']. Section 22(g), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(g)
(1970), requires that shares be sold only in exchange for cash or securities, except in cases
of reorganization or dividend distribution to security holders. Finally, § 18(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-18(d) (1970), prohibits the issuance of warrants or options except on a ratable basis
to existing shareholders. The SEC has permitted employees of advisory companies to
purchase shares in funds managed by their employers without paying a sales charge. To
this extent, they are allowed to purchase cheap stock. However, reallocation of equitable
ownership, i.e., public subsidization of adviser personnel, would not occur, since net asset
value would still determine each shareholder's interest. See In re Counselors Inv. Fund,
Inc., Investment Co. Act Release No. 2700, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L.
REP. 76,580, at 80,249 (1958); In re Dow Theory Inv. Fund, Inc, Investment Co. Act
Release No. 2694, 38 S.E.C. 286 (1958); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l(h) (1972).
4 Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941); Tolins,
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CoasNau. L.Q. 77 (1940); Note, Regulation of
Investment Companies, 88 U. PA. L. RaV. 584 (1940). An extensive SEC investigation
exposed many of the improprieties. SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRuSTS AND INVESTMENT
1978]
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features of available liquidity and freedom from market discounts,
which provide greater security for shareholders, attracted the bulk of
post-1929 investment company investors. 5 In order to continue to profit
from their entrepreneurial efforts, advisers organizing mutual funds
after the crash created funds as separate corporate entities with no
management of their own and then contracted with them for invest-
ment advice and administrative services.6 As the assets of mutual funds
grew through sales promotion or capital accretion, the management
fees, which typically are structured to some extent as a percentage of
assets under management, correspondingly increased. The management
contracts themselves became valuable commodities, allowing the ad-
visers to capitalize upon their promotional success and thereby to
benefit from their entrepreneurial efforts. 7
The investigations of the SEC in the late 1930's, s however, re-
vealed that management contracts were often sold to successors who
lacked the experience or competence of the original advisers, upon
whose names and reputations the shareholders had originally relied.9
Moreover, purchasers were frequently prompted to pay large amounts
for these contracts with the promise not only of earning the attendant
management fees, but also of using the pooled monies for their own
purposes. Congress responded with the 1940 Act, which in relevant
part requires that all investment company management contracts auto-
matically terminate upon purported assignment 0 or upon the sale of a
controlling block of stock in the adviser.1 ' In addition, the award of a
new contract following such a termination must be approved initially
by the unaffiliated directors and shareholders of a fund. 2 Nevertheless,
advisers generally perform all aspects of portfolio management and
COMPANIES, PART TIPtEE: ABUSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES (1940) [hereinafter cited as SEC 1940
REPORT].
5 Jaretzki, supra note 4, at 306-07.
6 SEC 1940 REPORT 1918-25. These management contracts often had terms which
could extend up to 20 years at the sponsor's option. Id. at 1921.
7 Id. at 1918-36.
8 The investigations resulted.in the SEC 1940 Report.
9 See SEC 1940 REPORT 1918-36; cf. Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn, 94 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Oil Shares, Inc. v. Commercial Trust, 304
U.S. 551 (1938); O'Connor v. First Natl Investors' Corp., 168 Va. 908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935).
10 1940 Act § 15(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
11 The Act defines "assignment" to include the transfer of a controlling block of
adviser stock. Id. § 2(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(4) (1970). This transaction would accomplish
the same practical result as an outright transfer because by gaining control of the man-
agement company the purchaser can appoint its own personnel and institute its own
investment policies.
12 Id. §§ 15(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a), (c) (1970).
[Vol. 58:195
REWARD FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL RISK
administrative operation, leaving shareholders little opportunity to re-
fuse the successor chosen by the retiring adviser or his principals, since
rejection would leave the fund without management of any kind.13
Thus, despite the provisions of the 1940 Act, retiring advisers have
been able to derive entrepreneurial reward much like an entrepreneur
does in a conventionally formed, internally managed corporation
through his sale of corporate shares. Moreover, at least twenty advisory
companies have "gone public,"'14 often permitting their principals to
reap enormous entrepreneurial profits' 5 without abdicating control
of the management company and the funds it manages and, at the same
time, allowing them to continue to receive generous salaries as the
management company's officers.
By denying the adviser profit from a transfer of its advisory duties,
Rosenfeld may, therefore, eliminate an important source of entre-
preneurial reward for organizers and promoters of mutual funds. The
proscription could, moreover, be directed at all entrepreneurial reward,
regardless of its source, since the reward of entrepreneurial effort in the
mutual fund context must be accomplished through the direct or
indirect use of the control an adviser has over a fund. Thus, the deci-
sion has important implications for the sale of stock in investment
advisory companies, in both private negotiated transactions and public
offerings, and, perhaps more significantly, for the determination of the
composition, the structure, and ultimately the size of management fees.
The denial of entrepreneurial reward suggested by a broad reading
of Rosenfeld comes at a time when other avenues of income for ad-
visers are being eliminated or threatened. The 1970 Amendments 6 to
the 1940 Act impose a more stringent standard upon mutual fund
advisers with regard to the amount of compensation they may legally
derive from their advisory relationships. The 1940 Act now imposes
upon advisers a fiduciary duty with regard to management fees and
13 See Wiliheim v. Murchison, 203 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd per curiam sub
nom. Willheim v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 303 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1962); SEC,
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GRowTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SEC 1966 REPORT]; R. SMrrH, THE
GIul[ TRUTH ABOUT MUTUAL FUNDS 28-30 (1963).
14 SEC 1966 PORT 46; see, e.g., Prospectus, Franklin Resources, Inc., July 28, 1971
(adviser); cf. Prospectus, The Zeigler Co., Inc., Dec. 7, 1971 (brokerage house which is
principal underwriter for three mutual funds).
15 The shareholders of the Dreyfus Corporation received a total of $41,326,933.75 for
88o of the company's stock sold in 1965. Newman v. Stein, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L RP. 93,126, at 91,090 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972).
16 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 [hereinafter cited as "1970
Amendments" or "Amendments'].
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other material compensation payments, replacing the lax corporate
waste standard developed at common law with one of reasonableness.' 7
This new standard will subject all management compensation, includ-
ing brokerage commissions and underwriter fees, to closer judicial
scrutiny.
Immediately prior to the Rosenfeld pronouncement, the First
Circuit held, in Moses v. Burgin,18 that advisers must present to
mutual fund independent directors the possibility of establishing bro-
ker-dealer affiliates for the purpose of recapturing brokerage commis-
sions on behalf of the funds. Under Moses, independent directors,
acting within the proper exercise of their business judgment, cannot
refuse to recapture commissions whenever brokerage recapture through
affiliates, or otherwise, is possible. Moses does permit independent di-
rectors to weigh the risks attendant to establishing a brokerage opera-
tion, and, if they conclude that the financial savings are outweighed by
those risks, to forego creation of an affiliate. 9 By condemning the use
of brokerage on the adviser's behalf, Moses also appears to prohibit
advisers from allocating brokerage to reward other broker-dealers for
selling shares of the funds the adviser manages. The SEC has embraced
this position.20 Some industry representatives, however, have expressed
the fear that this reduction in financial incentive to sell mutual fund
17 New § 36(b), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970). For the historical developments
leading to the final version of the 1970 Amendments, see Rottenberg, Developing Limits
on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7 HIav. J. LaosS. 309 (1970). For an analysis
of the new standard, see Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standard of
Fiduciary Duty -Interpreting the 1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 CORNELL L Rev. 627 (1971).
There has been some question as to whether the fiduciary standard requires a reason-
ableness test. See Baris, Mutual Fund Legislation, 4 Rev. SEC. REG. 977 (1971). SEC staff
members are sure that it does: "The legislative history thus supports the position that
the fiduciary duty standard and the test of reasonableness are the same in substance."
Freedman & Rosenblatt, Duties to Mutual Funds, 4 REv. SEc. REG. 937, 940 (1971).
18 445 F.2d 369 (Ist Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994
(1971).
19 A SEC opinion, however, suggests that if an affiliate of the adviser in such a case
continues to handle fund brokerage, the profits of the affiliate must be taken into account
by independent directors in management fee negotiations. In re First Multifund of
America, Inc., Investment Co. Act Release No. 6700, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 78,209, at 80,600 (1971). If the profits are offset dollar for dollar against the
management fee, the practical effect would be similar to the establishment of a fund
affiliate. See generally Wyckoff, Recapture of Fund Brokerage, 4 Rev. SEC. REG. 847 (1971).
The advent of negotiated rates is also materially diminishing the revenue formerly avail-
able to mutual fund advisers. See generally Note, Fiduciary Requirements and the Succes-
sion Fee upon the Change of Mutual Fund Advisers, 85 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1972).
20 SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Market, reprinted in BNA
SEc. REG. & L. Rm'., No. 137 (pt. II), Feb. 2, 1972, at 7; cf. A MosroFF, THE SEC SaAKs
58-59 (1972).
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shares will materially reduce sales of such shares, for, as the maxim goes,
mutual fund shares are sold, not bought. Since sales directly affect the
size of mutual funds, management fees will likewise be affected.
Furthermore, for the first time since the enactment of the 1940
Act, the mutual fund industry is experiencing a prolonged period of
net redemptions, i.e., more money is being taken out of mutual funds
through the redemption of fund shares than new sales bring in. Since
management fees are at least in part related to the size of the funds
advisers manage, advisory compensation is on the average diminishing.
Rosenfeld has caused great concern among industry observers;
the opinion has been claimed to have created a "new and fundamental
crisis' 21 which "threatens to rock the mutual fund industry at its
very foundation," 22 and which will lead "to a major restructuring of
the [mutual] fund industry."23 Lawyers have been left with grave un-
certainties as to the rights and duties of the parties involved in a trans-
fer of advisory duties or in a sale of a controlling block of adviser
stock. Some transactions have been consummated on the advice of
legal counsel that Rosenfeld was inapplicable,24 but others have either
been aborted, forcing advisory personnel to remain in their present
management positions for economic reasons,25 or have been carried
out only after it has been arranged for the fund, not the adviser, to
receive payment for the successor's opportunity to manage the fund.28
In response both to the uncertainty of the respective rights and
obligations of parties to a transfer or sale, and to the apparent denial
21 Heineman, Mutual Funds Face Crisis, Lazard to Settle Lawsuit; Questions Remain,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, § 3, at 3, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, July 20, 1971, at 41, col.
2; Wall St. J., July 27, 1971, at 7, col. 1 (eastern ed.); id., July 20, 1971, at 9, col. 1 (eastern
ed.).
22 Lenzer, You Can't Sell a Mutual Fund-Or Can You?, 5 INsTITUTONAL INVESrOR,
Nov. 1971, at 44.
23 Lipton, Rosenfeld v. Black, 4 REv. SEC. RE. 853, 856 (1971). See also Analysis: The
Problems of Rosenfeld v. Black, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., No. 119, Sept. 22, 1971, at B-1.
24 In such cases, of course, the proxy statement submitted to stockholders in con-
nection with the approval of a new advisory contract with the successor advisor
must discuss the legal problems arising from the decision and indicate counsel's
opinion as to the non-applicability of the decision to the transaction.
A. Mosrops, supra note 20, at 53.
25 Huard, Insurance Company Involvement in the Marketing of Equity Products, 13
B.C. IND. & Comt. L. Rnv. 1195, 1203-05 (1972). Apparently not all interest has waned, as
the following advertisement demonstrates.
CONTROL OF MUTUAL FUND MANAGEMENT COMPANY
Sought for cash by principals well known in financial community. Should at least
break even with approx. $5-8 Million under management. Geographic location no
problem, but should be relocatable to Southern California.
Wall St. J., May 4, 1972, at 21, col. 6 (eastern ed.).
26 See note 248 infra.
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of "the same kind of opportunity for profit in capital value that you
get in other businesses," 27 the SEC has drafted legislation, S. 407 1,28
designed to make continuation of the advisory relationship between a
successor adviser and a fund dependent upon proven performance and
service. This effect is to be accomplished by requiring a board, com-
prised of at least seventy-five percent totally independent directors, to
govern the fund's management for at least three years following the
sale of control of the management company or of the advisory po-
sition. The SEC has theorized that, under the proposal, any considera-
tion an adviser can derive upon the assignment of an advisory contract
would be limited because the purchaser would not be ensured of auto-
matic succession to the advisory position.29
This article will analyze the two chief means of rewarding mutual
fund sponsor entrepreneurial risk: management fees and succession
fees. It will examine what a succession fee is and why it is paid by a suc-
cessor to its predecessor adviser. Through an analysis of Rosenfeld, the
article will attempt to articulate, as the Rosenfeld court failed to do,
the reasons why only a complete prohibition of succession fees will
provide sufficient shareholder protection. The effect of the proscription
of succession fees on transfers in the form of sales of control of manage-
ment companies will also be considered. The article will argue for the
continued allowance of entrepreneurial reward, suggesting, however,
that entrepreneurial reward be paid as a component of periodic man-
agement fees. Finally, the adoption of S. 4071 is urged, but only after
several alterations are made.
I
THE SUCCESSION FEE
A succession fee is the payment an incoming adviser makes to the
departing one for the opportunity to advise the mutual fund. It can
be in the form of an outright payment of money, stock, or other
27 Casey, Casey on the Issues, 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESroR, Oct. 1971, at S0.
28 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). [Editor's Note: S. 4071 was reintroduced in the Senate
on January 17, 1973 by Senator H. Williams as S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).]
29 The SEC hopes that any consideration an adviser can derive upon an effectual
assignment of an advisory contract would be limited by the natural market factors which
come into play when the purchaser is not ensured automatic succession to and continuation
of the advisory position. Letter from SEC Chairman William J. Casey to Senator Harrison
A. Williams, Jr., reprinted in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 146, April 5, 1972, at 1-1 [here-
inafter cited as Casey Letter]. See also Address by A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., Current Devel-
opments for Investment Companies, Investment Company Institute, Washington, D.C.,
May 18, 1972, at 9-12 (on file at the Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Herlong].
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property. Alternatively, when the new adviser takes control of the
former adviser's institutional entity through a purchase of controlling
shares, a purchase of the assets, or a merger, a succession fee can take
the form of a premium above the price that would otherwise be paid
if the advisory relationship were not attendant to such a purchase. It
is important, therefore, prior to a discussion of the legal rules govern-
ing succession fees, to understand both the nature of the opportunity a
succession fee purchases, and, in view of the fact that a mutual fund
has its own board of directors which can theoretically contract for
advisory services with any responsible organization, why it must pres-
ently be paid to an outgoing adviser and not to a fund.
A. The Opportunity
There are two primary reasons why a prospective adviser might
pay for the opportunity to manage a mutual fund. First, the business
has potential to produce enormous management fees and high profit
margins. Second, since investment company clients never discontinue
the management relationship, there is no risk of loss of the position.30
Management fees are generally based upon a percentage of the assets
under management. As a fund grows, either through additional sales or
capital accretion, so does the management fee.31 The cost of managing
a fund, however, does not generally increase proportionately with its
assets. Although it may be too simple to say that "it costs no more in
research effort to buy 100 shares of stock than 1,000,1132 significant econ-
omies of scale do exist in mutual fund management.33 Thus, as assets
30 For a discussion of this characteristic of mutual funds, which largely results from
the manner in which independent directors discharge their duties, see notes 43-54 and
accompanying text infra.
31 There are three basic forms of mutual fund management fees: (1) a fixed per-
centage of fund net asset value, (2) a percentage of net asset value scaled down for in-
creased assets, and (3) a percentage of net asset value supplemented by a bonus or penalty
determined by portfolio performance relative to an objective market measure, such as
the Standard & Poor's or the Dow Jones industrial averages. Glazer, A Study of Mutual
Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 259-60 (1970). There is no requirement that
management fees be based on a percentage of assets under management. For a suggestion
of a flat fee, see Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Un-
affiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058, 1067 (1967).
82 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 424 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), aff'g 194 F. Supp.
207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
3 "[]t would cost little more or no more to manage and domicile (an investment]
company of $30,000,000 capital than one of $3,000,000." SEC 1940 REPoRT 1285 (statement
of W. Thorold, controlling stockholder, Federated Management Corp.); see WHARTON
SCHOOL OF FINANCB AND CoMMERcE, A STUDy OF MUTUAL FuNDs, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON REPORT]; Mundheim, supra note
31, at 1065.
1973]
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increase, advisers' profit margins grow at a proportionately faster rate.
In especially large funds the profit becomes immense.3 4
These massive fees obviously compensate advisers for more than
mere management and portfolio advice. In 1966 eleven investment
companies had internal management, i.e., fund-hired personnel ran
the investment company.35 The SEC found that on the average the
cost of management services in these companies was significantly
lower than that found in funds which have institutionally distinct
management companies. 6 The extra margin of profit must be justified,
then, if at all, as a reward for the initial entrepreneurial risk each ad-
viser takes when it first organizes a fund and as repayment of the losses
experienced until the fund reaches an asset level sufficient to be self-
supporting.37
34 For example, the industry's largest adviser, Investors Diversified Services (IDS),
earned a profit of $17,786,000 on total income of $39,073,000 in the fiscal year ending June
1965. SEC 1966 REP oRT 122. This resulted in a profit margin of over 45%. Id. Other more
efficient advisers with smaller total profits had even higher profit margins, with the
maximum over 68%. Id.
In the late 1950's and the 1960's, over 50 lawsuits were instituted challenging the
propriety of these enormous fees. For a comprehensive survey, see Eisenberg & Phillips,
Mutual Fund Litigation-New Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L.
REv. 73 (1962). The aftermath of the litigation is briefly summarized in Note, supra note
17, at 633-37. Most suits ended in settlement, with advisers agreeing to some reduction in
the fee as the assets under management increased. Often this meant that the industry's
most common rate, .5%, was reduced to A% and in some cases to .3% on the assets above
certain break points. For example, Investors Mutual Fund, the largest fund in the IDS
complex, presently pays a graduated scale of fees beginning with .5% on the first $250
million of average net assets and ending with .3% on all assets in excess of $1,750 million.
In 1970, Investors Mutual had $2,508,101,830 in assets and paid IDS $7,975.205 in net fees
for an effective rate of roughly .32%. Prospectus, Investors Mutual, Inc., Jan. 18, 1973, at 5.
In addition, many advisers have affiliate broker-dealer organizations which execute
large portions of their funds' brokerage, despite the spectre of the Moses case. See Moses
v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). Although the level of a fixed commission rate is
declining and many institutional size orders are not as profitable as before, significant
amounts of profit still exist for advisers. The absence of a fixed commission rate may also
increase the nominal size of management fees. Some advisers faced with both the difficult
conflicts of interest situation, in which they must in effect bargain with themselves for
appropriate brokerage charges, and the declining profits from this source, are insisting that
trades above the fixed level be executed at their cost, but that management fees be in-
creased to reflect this loss. The effect then of negotiated rates may be merely to "visualize"
the total amount of management compensation, not to reduce it.
85 SEC 1966 REPORT 102. Subsequently, the MIT-MIGS complex of Boston, formerly
the largest internally run group of funds, externalized management.
86 Id. at 102-11.
37 Id. at 77, 145; Conference on Mutual Funds, The Mutual Fund Management Fee,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 726, 756 (1967) (remarks of P. Loomis, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Con-
ference on Mutual Funds]; Note, Management Compensation: The SEC Mutual Funds
Report, 3 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 66, 67-68 (1967).
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At present, however, no mutual fund delineates the portion of the
fee the adviser earns as payment for entrepreneurial risk or initial
losses. As a result, when an adviser arranges a transfer to a new adviser,
the fee rate remains the same; the successor will receive fees compen-
sating it for an entrepreneurial risk it never took. The selling adviser
will, of course, compute its sale price as a capitalization of future
profits. This may permit the seller in effect to be rewarded tvice for its
promotional talents. It also changes the position of the adviser of the
fund from that of entrepreneur to that of capitalist.
By determining its sale price from a capitalization of future profits,
the retiring adviser can demand a sum at least equal to the present
value of those profits, less the present value of potential market value
of the successor's or its principals' personal services. Without more, a
successor would do as well in the labor market; there would be no
reason to risk its capital. The possibility of deriving additional com-
pensation sufficient to assure both a return of its capital investment
and a reasonable rate of interest must exist. An optimistic adviser, be-
lieving it can develop the opportunity and increase profits, will take
the risk. Several avenues are open to a confident adviser who wishes to
achieve a higher return.
First, a prospective adviser may believe that it can manage the
mutual fund more efficiently than its predecessor. Greater efficiency
will reduce cost, and, if all else remains the same, the successor's net
income will be greater than that of its predecessor. For example, an
adviser managing several funds with a total asset base sufficient to per-
mit a high profit operation may be able to take another fund into its
complex at a low marginal increase in operating expenses, producing
larger profits on that fund's management fee than an adviser which
managed only that one fund could produce.
A prospective adviser may also believe that it can manage mutual
funds more effectively than its predecessor and thereby achieve better
performance. Superior investment performance often results in profits
not only for the shareholders but also for advisers. Unrealized capital
gains and realized earnings (which are often reinvested by sharehold-
ers) enlarge management fees because they are generally structured
as a percentage of assets under management. A growing number of
advisory contracts have performance incentive clauses which permit
advisers to earn a proportionately larger percentage when investment
results are better, on a risk adjusted basis, than a given market indi-
cator or standard, such as the Dow Jones industrial average. Superior
performance is especially attractive to prospective mutual fund in-
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vestors. While empirical supporting data is still inconclusive, many
mutual fund sponsors believe the strongest selling point they can have
is good performance.38
Still another reason prospective advisers are willing to pay suc-
cession fees is to avoid the risk of organizing and promoting a fund to
a similar size.39 Not all mutual fund sponsors starting new funds are
successful. One industry observer estimates that only one out of every
five sponsors ever makes a profit, principally because sponsors are un-
able to amass enough assets under management to produce a manage-
ment fee sufficient to cover operating costs. 40
Thus, a prospective adviser desirous of entering the industry is
faced with two alternatives: organizing and promoting a new fund, or
paying a succession fee to manage a previously established one. In
making its decision, it will have to compare the costs of each course
of action. In organizing a new fund, it may be able to estimate with
relative certainty the fixed capital costs; however, it must also value
the promotional time and effort needed to organize the underwriting
and management operations and the sales team or network. Addition-
ally, until the assets accumulate to a self-supporting size, operating
losses must be absorbed. A proper cost estimate must include the con-
siderable risk of failing ever to reach a profitable asset level. To the
prospective adviser that believes its forte is not promotion but manage-
ment and financial analysis, the opportunity of taking over an estab-
lished fund and foregoing the entrepreneurial risks absorbed by its
predecessor will be worth a great deal.41
38 The best recent example of the value of performance is the T. Rowe Price complex.
For the last several years the funds managed by the Rowe Price management company have
consistently been leaders in risk-adjusted performance. Despite being no-load funds, which
means that no salesman is paid to sell fund shares, the three Price funds garnered 14%
of the total gross sales of the 1,000 funds in the industry in 1971. Bleakley, How Persis-
tence Has Paid Off For T. Rowe Price, 6 INsrrrTIONAL INvESTOR, April 1972, at 60. See
also Robertson & Falk, A Baltimore Firm's Winning "Philosophy": T. Rowe Price's Private
Business, 85 FORTUNE, April 1972, at 137. Even more spectacularly, the same three funds had
over.50% of the industry's net sales for the same period (id.), indicating that performance
not only aids new sales, but also deters satisfied investors from redeeming shares.
89 The advantages to an insurance company of purchasing, instead of developing, a
mutual fund management company are considered in Huard, supra note 25, at 1203-05.
40 "We would guess that as much as 80% of the individual management companies
operate at a break-even point or at a loss." Arthur Lipper, president of the Arthur Lipper
Corp., which surveys the mutual fund industry, quoted in Can They Survive?, FoaBms, Dec.
1, 1971, at 87.
41 Both the prospective adviser that cannot offer investors good investment analysis
and the present adviser that, due to substandard performance, has been unable to accu-
mulate enough assets under management to be profitable and has thus stifled investor
enthusiasm, will view the chance to succeed to an established fund as a favorable oppor-
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Finally, an unscrupulous adviser might pay a succession fee in
order to obtain the opportunity to loot a fund or otherwise to use
the assets on its own behalf.4 Misuse of a fund's assets can be accom-
plished in subtle ways, most of which are specifically proscribed by the
Act.4 3 Unfortunately, some prospective advisers may not be deterred
by these prohibitions.
The prospective adviser that believes it can serve the shareholders
of a fund more efficiently and effectively than the present management
should be encouraged to do so, even if its decision is motivated by a
business judgment to forego the entrepreneurial risk of promotion.
The shareholders of an organized fund want the best investment man-
agement available; an adviser's promotional abilities are of relatively
little importance to the shareholders. Once a self-supporting asset
level is reached, many observers, including the SEC, believe that "exist-
ing shareholders . . . derive little or no benefit from the sale of new
shares." 44 Those prospective advisers that wish to purchase an advisory
relationship either because they are incapable of developing one them-
selves or because they plan to use the acquired fund's portfolio for
their own benefit should not be permitted the opportunity, despite the
societal interest in rewarding the retiring adviser for developing the in-
vestment vehicle through its entrepreneurial talents.
B. Payment to the Predecessor
The backbone of the 1940 Act is the requirement of independent
directors on every investment company board of directors.45 Prior to
1940, most advisers would staff boards of directors which they organ-
ized with men from their own company. In this manner advisers were
able to control all corporate decisions of their funds and to "negotiate"
very favorable contractual terms.46 In recognition of the fact that such
relationships lacked any semblance of arm's-length bargaining and
provided few safeguards for investors, the Act requires that forty per-
tunity. Furthermore, because the retiring adviser may know that the alternative of self-
development is not available to the buyer, it will be in a position to demand a higher price
than a successful or confident adviser would be willing to pay.
42 Examples of how this may be done include churning, i.e., excessively trading the
portfolio through a brokerage affiliate in order to earn unduly large brokerage fees, and
investing in companies in which the adviser is interested, either as an underwriter, share-
holder, or lender.
43 For example, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970), prohibits self-dealing on the part
of advisers or their personnel.
44 SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Market, supra note 20,
at 7. See also SEC 1966 REPORT 263; Mundheim, supra note 31, at 1069.
45 1940 Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970).
46 SEC 1940 REPoRT 1499-522.
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cent of the boards of most mutual funds consist of persons unaffiliated
with their advisers. 47
Unfortunately, the regulatory scheme has not provided the arm's-
length bargaining envisioned by Congress. In a comprehensive study
of mutual fund independent directors, William Nutt, then a Fellow
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of
Financial Institutions, found that in practice the annual meetings at
which advisory contracts are renewed bear "few of the earmarks of
arm's-length bargaining... . . Contract renewal is not a bid-and-ask
proposition."48 Instead, Nutt concluded, an adviser simply presents a
complete contract, including a management fee provision, and the
independent directors acquiesce in its terms. He found no instances
of directors shopping for another management company with a better
performance record or lower fee; no director surveyed suggested that
a board or any independent director should as much as contact other
advisers to ascertain the price of comparable services.49
Nutt's study confirms earlier suspicions that independent di-
rectors do not view their role as that of a bargaining adversary of the
adviser. Instead, they see themselves as watchdogs for only the most
egregious adviser misconduct. This attitude reflects the dual nature
of the director-adviser relationship in the mutual fund industry. Most
independent directors are selected by the adviser; they are not, after all,
"self-appointed strangers.""0 Shareholders must formally elect an ad-
viser's choice of director, but, in practice, the adviser's power to place
the name of a director on the proxy statement is "tantamount to ap-
pointment."5' Independent directors are keenly aware that they owe
their tenure to the adviser. 52
47 1940 Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970). When an adviser or an interested
person serves as a regular broker for a fund, or as its principal underwriter, a majority of
the board must consist of disinterested persons. Id. §§ 10(b)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(b)(1),
(2) (1970). In general, an interested person is a 5% shareholder of an adviser, his imme-
diate family, or any broker or dealer. Id. § 2(a)(19)(A), 15 U.S.c. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A) (1970).
See Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. R.v. 179, 211-14
(1971).
The original purpose of the requirement was to establish at least a modicum of arm's-
length bargaining between a fund and an adviser, thereby protecting the fund shareholders
from self-interested overreaching on the part of an adviser. On especially important issues,
such as management contract award and renewal, the Act further mandates that a majority
of the independent members agree, effectually requiring boards to be totally independent
for decision making purposes. See 1940 Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970).
48 Nutt, supra note 47, at 222-23.
49 Id. at 223.
50 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion).
51 Nutt, supra note 47, at 216; see SEC 1966 RPoar 129.
52 While some independent boards have begun to assume more responsibility in the
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Moreover, new directors are usually oriented to their duties by
representatives of the adviser. 53 The responsibilities of independent
mutual fund directors are unique and more extensive than those of
directors in typical industrial corporations. New directors often do not
realize this and, if they are not fully briefed by the other independent
directors or fund counsel, may fail to recognize the significant conflicts
of interest inherent in the dual entity structure.54 Thus, independent
directors place unwarranted trust in adviser officials.
Finally, because mutual fund investors tend to select a particular
fund on the basis of its adviser's reputation rather than on the basis of
the fund's intrinsic qualities, many independent directors feel that the
shareholder purchases what is essentially an individual contract with the
adviser and that the appropriate solution to poor performance or inade-
quate service is redemption by the shareholder, not a change in advisers
or contractual relations by a fund.5 5 This concept, often labelled the
"shell theory" because it reduces a fund to a mere legal "shell," has
been advanced by some legal commentators as the appropriate model
for legal rights and obligations in a mutual fund.50 But the 1940 Act
and the 1970 Amendments reject this suggestion. The requirements
that the advisory contract be written57 and that it describe all com-
pensation to be paid a management company,58 that the contract be
selection of new members, in most cases the unaffiliated directors serve at the pleasure of
an adviser and are beholden to it. A director who instigates any actions that an adviser in-
terprets as adverse to its interests, such as inquiries to other advisers or demands for lower
fees, may find his name deleted from the recommended slate at the next election.
53 Nutt, supra note 47, at 219-20. A less ambitions piece has reached similar con-
clusions. See Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds,
70 MICH. L. Rxv. 696 (1972).
54 Mundheim, supra note 31, at 1059.
55 See Hearings on H.R. 9510, 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 633,
635 (1967) (statement of R. Jennings).
5 See Conference on Mutual Funds 747-49 (remarks of A. Jaretzki, Jr.); Lobell, Rights
and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258 (1961).
In essence . . . a mutual fund is a cluster of individual service arrange-
ments ....
The pooling of assets, whatever the form used to accomplish it, has only con-
venience and economy as its motive and is intended to have only convenience and
economy as its effects.
Rights, expectations, obligations, performance, all the palpable realities of
fund operation, flow into the mold only with sales of fund shares. Each sale of the
Fund's shares is the creation of another contract-the Fund's contract with the
investor. This is the "real" contract.
Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. Rxv. 181, 185-86, 210 (1961).
57 1940 Act § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
58 Id. § If(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a).(1) (1970).
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termiriable without penalty by the board or shareholders on sixty days
notice, 9 that the initial contract award be approved by a majority of
both the independent directors and the shareholders,60 and that con-
tinuance of the contract be annually reviewed by a majority of inde-
pendent directors,61 indicate that Congress did not intend the fund to
be merely an institutional lorication. 2
The prevailing permissive attitude on the part of independent
directors results in the virtual certainty that a mutual fund wil an-
nually renew its advisory contract with the present adviser, regard-
less of prolonged dismal performance or high management fees:
"Changes in investment advisers have almost always occurred only
with the cooperation (or at best acquiescence) of the existing ad-
viser." 63 For a prospective or competing adviser to assume managerial
responsibilities of an existing fund, it must convince the fund's ad-
viser, not its independent directors, of the benefits of such a change.
Naturally this is most often done with financial persuasions, namely, a
succession fee.
The Act does provide that a majority of the shareholders can ter-
minate an advisory relationship.64 Thus, at least theoretically, an ad-
viser eager to manage a fund could take its case directly to the
shareholders, bypassing an unreceptive board. Most mutual funds,
however, have a large and widespread body of shareholders. The ex-
pense of a proxy fight would be considerable, perhaps not significantly
59 Id. § 15(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(8) (1970).
60 Id. §§ 15(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a), (c) (1970).
61 Id. §§ 15(b)(1), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(b)(1), (c) (1970).
62 The fact that the 1970 Amendments deem advisers fiduciaries, at least with respect
to management compensation (see note 17 supra), could be interpreted as a move toward
the shell theory, because the existence of the separate fund entity no longer supports the
legal fiction that its presence establishes sufficient check upon the adviser to dispel the
need for the typical legal responsibilities incumbent upon those entrusted with other
people's money.
But while Congress placed heavier statutory burdens on advisers, it also strengthened
the role of independent directors. They are now required to "request and evaluate" all
information that may be reasonably necessary to evaluate the terms of a management con-
tract. 1940 Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970), as amended, 84 Stat. 1413. For an analysis
of this duty, see Nutt, supra note 47, at 195-96. Moreover, the directors must now person-
ally attend the meeting called for contract award or renewal. Id. Thus, the Amendments
do not abandon the concept of an interpositioned entity providing real safeguards against
adviser overreaching. It is more likely that the characterization of advisers as fiduciaries
merely reflects "a legislative judgment that the fund's independent directors do not nor-
mally deal at arm's-length with the investment adviser," and not a judgment that their
existence is meaningless. Mundheim & Nutt, The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds,
WHARTON Q., Spring 1972, at 8, 10.
63 Mundheim & Nutt, supra note 62, at 22.
64 1940 Act § 15(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(3) (1970).
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less than the succession fee demanded by the adviser. Moreover, the
results would be unpredictable. Since most mutual fund shareholders
base their investment upon the reputation of an adviser and choose
mutual funds for the very purpose of leaving the management of their
money to someone else, they would be loath to take an active role
in the business matters of a fund, particularly to change the identity of
its adviser.65
Since both independent directors and shareholders acquiesce in
management recommendations, advisers not only can be assured of their
retention by the fund, but can also virtually guarantee acceptance of
their chosen successor by the respective groups. Thus, when a successor
pays a succession fee to a retiring adviser, that fee represents not only
an inducement for the current adviser to step down, but also assures
that the succession will be approved by the fund and that the successor
will be able to maintain the advisory relationship at its pleasure.
True independence on the part of unaffiliated directors would,
of course, eliminate these factors. If upon the retirement-of an adviser
competitive bids were sought and applicants were reviewed not only
on the basis of the price of their services but on their past performance
records, the directors could secure for a fund the premium an adviser
now receives for recommending a particular successor. If a successor
were willing to pay an adviser for the opportunity to succeed as adviser
to the fund, "it would in all likelihood [be] willing to make the same
concession to the fund."66 This concession could take the form of re-
duced future management fees or a lump sum payment upon engage-
ment, whichever a board believed to be more advantageous. 67
This industry pattern, in which advisers effectively determine
their tenure and successors, does not result solely from the failure of
independent directors to fulfill their directorial responsibilities. There
are practical reasons which may justify choosing a present adviser over
65 This is not to suggest that redemption is the only appropriate means of expressing
dissatisfaction with advisory services which the law will recognize. It merely demonstrates
that shareholders, who unlike directors are not in a position to closely evaluate the reasons
for poor adviser performance, are more likely to redeem than to wait for (or promote) a
proxy fight in order to secure new investment management.
60 Nutt, supra note 47, at 245.
67 This would, however, still leave the possibility that an adviser would demand a fee
for voluntarily quitting the relationship from an optimistic adviser willing to take its
chances. But if the selection procedure used by a board were extensive, the amount paid by
any one prospective successor would probably be small, reflecting the small chance of se-
lection from a potentially large pool of possible successors. This would reduce the degree
to which a new adviser must recoup its initial "capital investment," and would result in
even lower fees or more extensive services.
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possible competitors. First, the current adviser is a tested and seasoned
entity. During the course of the relationship, an adviser and its team
will become familiar to the board, permitting smooth working con-
ditions. Second, the fund may be a part of a complex of funds. Fund
complexes can provide several advantages, principally related to econo-
mies of scale, efficient use of specialized personnel, and coordinated sales.
If the other funds do not wish to switch advisers, a fund would have
to leave the complex and forego these advantages.68
A change in advisers over the opposition of the existing adviser
might result in a disruptive adjustment period for the fund.69 Unless
a successor were picked without an existing adviser's knowledge and the
chosen adviser was available to assume duties immediately, a fund
would be faced with having a less than enthusiastic adviser at the helm
during the interim. Furthermore, since a departing adviser may be
entitled to sixty days of management fees, a board may be reluctant
to have a successor begin immediately because of the duplication of
compensation.
Investment advisers typically perform many services other than
portfolio management, such as administration of shareholder accounts
and sales of fund shares. A board might find that a potential adviser
which has an excellent past performance record is not organized to
provide these additional services. Moreover, some advisers have en-
gaged in the questionable practice of providing in their respective
management contracts that the adviser will maintain all of a fund's
records and files."
Finally, one board of directors has implied that industry members
will presently negotiate only with mutual fund advisers, not with the
funds they manage. In a proxy statement sent to shareholders of the
approximately sixty-six million dollar Ivy Fund, recommending the
approval of the sale of its adviser Studley, Shupert &: Co., Inc. to Fidelity
Corporation for five million dollars worth of Fidelity stock, the board
68 See Mundheim & Nutt, supra note 62, at 22.
69 SEC 1966 REP RT 129.
7o Id. at 131.
In one notable incident, the independent board of the Investors Mutual Fund, known
for being truly independent, is reported to have actually investigated the possibilities of
finding a new adviser because its adviser, IDS, was providing management which resulted
in sustained below average performance. The board found, however, that under the ad-
visory contract IDS had exclusive control of the Fund's records. Making the switch would
have been an administrative nightmare because IDS could, as a practical matter, seriously
hamper the Fund's exercise of its state-created, unqualified right of access to the records.
Despite dissatisfaction with the services of IDS, the board decided to continue the ad-
visory relationship.
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stated that the independent directors "doubt[ed] that another respect-
able and competent investment manager would pay the Fund a pre-
mium for being retained as the Fund's investment adviser."7' Unless the
Ivy Fund independent directors detected a conspiracy in the industry
to discourage direct bargaining with mutual fund boards, the basis for
the statement seems questionable. Investment advisers, in intense com-
petition for pension and employee benefits and endowment fund ac-
counts, regularly make concessions to those funds in order to win ad-
visory contracts.
It may well be that some established management companies
are hesitant to negotiate directly with fund directors because they
wish to discourage active shopping by fund boards. They may believe
that such negotiations and the possible subsequent shift in advisers
could become a precedent for the industry, leading to the widespread
adoption of competitive bidding for investment company clients. Thus,
advisers may resist the temptation to increase their immediate revenues
for fear of establishing price and performance competition through-
out the industry, thus ultimately weakening their own secure position
as advisers to funds presently under their management.72
C. The Mutual Dependency of Price and Quality
Some commentators have suggested that the proper resolution of
problems posed by succession fees can be found by focusing solely on
the amount of management fees paid by shareholders through their
funds.73 They argue that "if the fees being received are excessive, then
the price received by the sellers of stock in the investment adviser is
really a capitalization of the unconscionable profits being taken from
the investment company, and therefore in equity it belongs to the
investment company shareholders." 74 Implicit is the notion that if the
fees meet the statutory standards, a succession fee would be proper, re-
gardless of its size. But the seller under this rule would be free to
select a successor, not on the basis of the candidate's expertise or com-
petence, but on the basis of his own financial interest. These com-
mentators further suggest that "corporate democracy" demands that
71 Proxy Statement, Ivy Fund, Inc., March 29, 1972, at 13. Ivy Fund had paid $334,577
for management and advisory services in 1971, and the proposed contract following the sale
would have made no change in the fee.
72 Despite the possible presence of these fears, the Ivy Fund directors probably could
have found one tested adviser which did not share such inhibitions. If not, and if the
reluctance of the industry were inexplicable on other grounds, the Ivy Fund directors might
well have investigated the possibilities of judicial remedy under the antitrust laws.
'73 See R. JENNINGs & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1247 (2d ed. 1968).
74 Id.
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shareholder approval operate as the sole assurance of the quality of a
successor adviser.75 This ignores the fact that shareholders have no
real choice in such a vote. Even if they did, they could not be expected
to have the time or resources to become fully informed of the nominee's
abilities. Although the fact that shareholders do invest primarily to se-
cure a particular adviser's management may be sufficient to deter inde-
pendent directors from recommending a switch except in cases of pro-
longed substandard performance or egregious adviser misconduct, that
consideration is not relevant when the adviser is voluntarily leaving.
The successor it recommends need not be accorded the same deference.
Moreover, the commentators' suggestions ignore the fact that an ad-
viser which receives only reasonable management fees can still demand
a premium, either for relinquishing its position, assuring award of
a new contract with the successor, or transferring a profitable relation-
ship the tenure of which is determinable by the transferee. The mere
payment of a premium will economically force the successor either to
cut costs and services or to charge more than mere management would
warrant. Even if the fees were within the statutory standard, the
shareholders will eventually pay the succession fee. Analysis cannot
focus solely on management fees, but must consider both the price that
shareholders must pay for advisory services and the quality of the in-
vestment management they receive.
Consideration of the quality of adviser performance is not an
onerous burden on either independent directors or reviewing courts.
First, without the ability to discontinue an advisory relationship, in-
dependent directors are unable to bargain effectively on advisory fee
matters.76 Both price and quality are necessarily mutually dependent;
one cannot be properly determined in the absence of the other.
Second, from a philosophical standpoint no essential difference
exists between providing protection for shareholders for the quality
of services they receive and providing similar safeguards for the cost
of those services. The alternatives of redemption and corporate de-
mocracy, while necessary, both suffer from limitations that make them
unsatisfactory as the sole protections. In view of the ultimate effect on
a mutual fund shareholder's investment, it seems more appropriate to
provide safeguards against poor performance than against manage-
ment fees, which are, economically speaking, relatively insignificant
75 Id. See also LobDl, supra note 56. Rottenberg chronicles the mutual fund industry's
argument along these lines in opposition to the 1970 Amendments. See Rottenberg, supra
note 17, at 337-43.
76 SEC 1966 REPORT 131.
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to each shareholder's investment. Performance is the risk investors
take in all investments, but a mutual fund shareholder should not
have to assume the risk of inattentive or incompetent investment ad-
visory services.
Finally, the fact that a shareholder has knowingly invested in a
fund which has had poor performance in the past, or would vote to
approve a management contract with an untested or substandard suc-
cessor, does not necessarily mandate that he assume the investment
risk of continued poor performance from that adviser. Management
fee rates are disclosed to all investors, but the shareholder has not
been left to fend for himself. Congress has recognized that as a practical
matter the sole shareholder bargaining tool is redemption, which when
coupled with reinvestment is often much costlier than switching cor-
porate stock. The situation is no different with performance of an
adviser-recommended successor. In all three cases, Congress has inter-
posed independent directors to represent the interests of the share-
holders.77
Determination of independent directors' duties in these situa-
tions, however, is difficult. No court has ever held that independent
directors were remiss in not seeking new management, because, for ex-
ample, the present adviser's performance was so poor that it would be
unreasonable to continue the relationship. No court has ever suggested
that an adviser-selected successor lacked sufficient qualifications to
justify a business judgment to recommend the award of a new con-
tract. Nor has any court ever suggested that independent directors
entertain bids from several potential advisers upon the voluntary de-
parture of a former adviser.
Nutt suggests, in perhaps the boldest statement to date, that in-
dependent directors should "contact other investment advisory houses
and solicit competing offers to manage the fund's portfolio."78 How-
ever, he recommends that this be done only as a "last resort" when
they become convinced that a present adviser offers no chance for good
performance. 79 A desire on the part of independent directors to secure
lower cost services would not be sufficient under this view. Indeed,
Nutt cautions that "[a]s fiduciaries, the directors have no obligation to
bargain for the least expensive investment advisory services for the
fund."8 0
77 See note 47 supra.
78 Nutt, supra note 47, at 250.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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These suggestions acknowledge the practical edge present advisers
enjoy over potential competitors for the advisory position, and adopt
it as the appropriate legal standard by which to judge director actions.
Under Nutt's view, independent directors should act only as watchdogs
for egregious adviser misconduct, not as bargaining representatives of
the shareholders. Without the freedom to terminate the management
fee negotiations and to look elsewhere for similar services, independent
directors lack the most essential element of arm's-length bargaining.
This position takes too narrow a view of the appropriate scope
of independent director action. Recognition of common industry prac-
tices does not mandate their enshrinement in a statutory scheme. In-
deed, the 1940 Act suggests otherwise. If Congress contemplated inde-
pendent directors acting only as policemen for outright fraud or looting,
it could have permitted interested directors numerically to control board
decisions in all situations. But Congress clearly did not envision such
a limited role for independent directors. In those situations which are
fraught with adviser self-interest, the Act states that only independent
directors have the power to act.81 Interested directors have no vote
at all.
Because advisers control the proxy machinery of their funds, in-
dependent directors generally must be satisfactory to advisers. It is
reasonable to assume that Congress recognized that advisers would be
able to hold veto power over the selection of independent directors. But
this does not mean that Congress also instituted all the procedural
safeguards in the Act merely to have them become ritualistic incanta-
tions for rubber-stamp independent directors. Using the widespread
industry reality of adviser domination as the legal model for indepen-
dent director duties credits Congress with the enactment of mere sur-
plusage which operates to reward advisers for the creation and main-
tenance of an overly friendly and timid board.
Only one court has recognized the active role contemplated for
independent directors by the Act. It stated that independent directors
have an affirmative duty to switch advisers if the present one is failing
to provide services ordinarily supplied by other advisers, resulting in
higher costs to the fund. That decision was Rosenfeld v. Black.82
81 1940 Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970)-
82 445 F.2d 1337, 1347 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 319 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf.
Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1971) (duty of independent directors to approve
management contracts entails more than mere ceremonial review).
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Ii
Rosenfeld v. Black
The case arose in an unusual factual setting. Most transfers of
mutual fund management responsibilities are accomplished by a sale
of stock in the advisory organization. Management companies with
other sources of revenue often incorporate subsidiaries to contract with
investment company clients. Lazard Freres & Co. did not, however,
incorporate a subsidiary to manage the fund it created in 1958, the
Lazard Fund. Lazard is a highly reputed Wall Street investment banker.
The revenue received from its advisory position was only a small
percentage of its total income. Thus, when Lazard decided that it
would be in the best interest of the Fund to have another adviser
assume command, a sale of Lazard's shares would have been inappro-
priate to accomplish a transfer only of the advisory position.
Lazard had selected a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., Moody's Investors Service, Inc., to assume management.
Moody's had never before advised a mutual fund or operated a dis-
tribution system, but it did manage over four billion dollars in assets
for other clients. Moody's formed a new mutual fund, Moody's Capital
Fund, and capitalized it with the statutory minimum, 100,000 dollars.83
Moody's Advisers and Distributors, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary,
was organized to manage the Capital Fund under a management con-
tract virtually identical to the Lazard contract. The succession was to
be accomplished by a merger of the Lazard Fund into the new Capital
Fund.
In a collateral agreement Lazard promised not to re-enter the
investment company business for at least five years. It also undertook
several obligations with regard to facilitating the transfer, such as pro-
viding research and administrative aid and making a partner available
for consultation. As consideration for these undertakings Lazard was to
receive 75,000 shares of Dun & Bradstreet common stock. Despite the
ostensibly independent character of these obligations, the agreement
was expressly conditioned on the approval of the merger and new
advisory contract by the shareholders. The market value of the stock
at the time of the merger was approximately forty dollars a share.
Lazard solicited proxies for the special meeting. The vote was
structured so that a vote for the merger, which was recommended by
83 1940 Act § 14(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(a)(1) (1970).
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Lazard, would also approve the new management contract with Moody's.
The shareholders approved the transaction.
Plaintiff Rosenfeld, a Fund shareholder, charged that the collateral
agreement was a sham and that the Dun &c Bradstreet stock was actually
paid for by Lazard's selection of Moody's as a successor and by the use
of the proxy machinery to secure the merger and management agree-
ment for Moody's Advisers and Distributors, Inc. The gravamen of the
complaint was that the transaction was, in essence, a sale of Lazard's
fiduciary office-a practice long prohibited by general equitable prin-
ciples.84
The district court 5 dismissed the complaint relying heavily on a
Ninth Circuit opinion, SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc. (IS1),86 which
held that the sale of fiduciary office rule does not apply to investment
advisers. The Second Circuit reversed. In doing so it negated the much
criticized rationale of the ISI case which dealt with the exclusivity of
the 1940 Act and its mechanical operation rather than with an analysis
of the sale of fiduciary office rule or an appraisal of the rule's appropri-
ateness with regard to mutual fund advisers and shareholders.
The Rosenfeld opinion's consideration of the fiduciary office rule
is so terse that at first blush it may appear that the Second Circuit,
despite reaching a position diametrically opposed to that reached in
ISI, was similarly unconcerned with the intrinsic merits of the fiduciary
office rule in the mutual fund context. A closer examination reveals,
however, that the court may have considered the consequences of its
holding more fully than some industry representatives have appreci-
ated. The following analysis will suggest that the decision is the neces-
sary result of Chief Judge Friendly's rejection of the popular notion
that contract award and renewal, made possible by the docility of inde-
pendent directors in the mutual fund industry, is akin to a property
right of mutual fund advisers. The heart of the decision is a simple
syllogism which might be stated as follows:
A fiduciary is prohibited from transferring its office for per-
sonal profit.
As an investment adviser, Lazard is a fiduciary.
Therefore, Lazard may not profit from the transfer of its
investment advisory position.
A. The Investment Adviser as Fiduciary
In holding that Lazard, as the investment adviser to a mutual
fund, had fiduciary responsibilities to the fund it managed, the court
84 See notes 87-93 and accompanying text infra.
85 319 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
86 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
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followed the established legal principle that whenever a dominant
party has discretionary control over the assets of another, and the
parties' relationship is founded on reliance and trust of that other
party, a fiduciary relationship exists.8 7 Although few courts had ever
specifically held that an adviser to a mutual fund was a fiduciary, the
extension of fiduciary duties to such an adviser had been foreshadowed
and came as no surprise.8
B. The Sale of Office Rule
The recognition that an investment adviser assumes a fiduciary
status does not necessarily mandate the application of the sale of office
rule, since the stringency of fiduciary obligations varies as the context
demands.
The equitable principle prohibiting profit from the transfer of
a fiduciary position has been applied in numerous situations, but
different courts have applied it on different theoretical bases. Some
courts consider the rule as only one version of the prohibition against
the diversion of proper opportunities for beneficiaries by fiduciaries to
their own benefit.8 9 Other courts apply the principle in an attempt to
keep beneficiary costs at a lower level.90 Still others enforce the standard
because they believe that profiteering on the part of the fiduciary
amounts to a taking of trust assets.9 ' Finally, some courts use the rule
87 See generally Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539 (1949).
88 See, e.g., Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); SEC v. Insurance Securities,
Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958); Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC,
151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945); cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.. 180
(1963); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 816 (5th Cir. 1970): "Like the earlier statutes, the
Investment Company Act was meant to provide another step toward a return to the under-
standing that those who manage other people's money are trustees acting for others." See
also Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 266, 272-76 (1959).
89 See, e.g., Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475 (1885) (corporate officers); Sauerhering v. Rue-
ping, 137 Wis. 407, 119 N.W. 184 (1909) (officers of mutual insurance company). In another
case involving the officer of a mutual life insurance company, the court noted that "[i]f
the succession was worth $125,000 in the market, the sale (if it were lawful) should have
been made by the directors for the benefit of the owners of the business, not of [the
officer]." Moulton v. Field, 179 F. 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1910). But see Note, Mutual Funds
and the Investment Company Advisory Contract, 50 VA. L. REv. 141, 167 (1964) (question-
ing applicability of diversion of corporate opportunity doctrine to advisers).
90 See, e.g., Eddy v. Capron, 4 R.I. 394, 397 (1856) (port physician):
The services performed under such appointments are paid for by salary or fees,
presumed to be adjusted by law to the precise point of adequate remuneration
for them. Any premium paid to obtain the office, other than that which the law
establishes or regulates, interferes with this adjustment, and tempts to peculation,
overcharges, and frauds, in the effort to restore the balance thus disturbed.
91 See, e.g., Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 114 N.W. 1047 (1908) (guardian); Elli-
cott v. Chamberlin, 38 NJ. Eq. 604 (1884); Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914)
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as a prophylactic to ensure that the selection of a successor will be
based solely upon the informed and objective judgment of the depart-
ing fiduciary.92 Chief Judge Friendly relied primarily upon this last
rationale to support the imposition of the rule:
A fiduciary endeavoring to influence the selection of a successor
must do so with an eye single to the best interests of the bene-
ficiaries. Experience has taught that, no matter how high-minded
a particular fiduciary may be, the only certain way to insure full
compliance with that duty is to eliminate any possibility of per-
sonal gain.93
C. Alternative Rules
Unfortunately, the Rosenfeld opinion does not explore why such
a stringent fiduciary standard is necessary to guarantee a satisfactory
selection. No examples of poor selection are given.94 Perhaps a corn-
(corporate directors); Bowers v. Bowers, 26 Pa. 74 (1856) (administrator); T.F. Pagel Lum-
ber Co. v. Webster, 231 Wis. 222, 285 N.W. 739 (1939) (corporate president). Contra, Basset
v. Miller, 8 Md. 548 (1855) (contract for relinquishment of administration of estate upheld;
court supervision of appointment of successor adequate protection).
92 See, e.g., Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926) (corporate officer); Moulton v.
Field, 179 F. 673 (7th Cir. 1910) (officer of mutual insurance company); Forbes v. MacDon-
ald, 54 Cal. 98 (1880) (trustee); Gilchrist v. Hatch, 183 Ind. 371, 106 N.E. 694 (1914) (cor-
porate directors and majority shareholder); Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265 (1882) (corporate
officer); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876) (corporate officer); Reed v. Catlett, 228 Mo.
App. 109, 68 S.W.2d 734 (1934) (mutual insurance company director); Heineman v. Mar-
shall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 92 S.W. 1131 (1905) (corporate officers); Gabriel Indus., Inc. v.
Defiance Indus., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 405, 239 N.E.2d 706, 293 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1968) (corporate
director); McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899) (president of mutual insurance
company); Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
14 N.Y.2d 679, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964) (corporate directors and controller); Sharrett v.
Northfield Say. & Loan Ass'n, 272 App. Div. 835, 70 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 1947) (cor-
porate director and officer); Cox v. Berry, 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P.2d 575 (1967) (corporate
president); Sauerhering v. Rueping, 137 Wis. 407, 119 N.W. 184 (1909) (officers of mutual
insurance company); cf. Mitchell v. Dilbeck, 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P.2d 233 (1937) (sale of cor-
porate office permitted; no showing of consideration paid specifically for use of influence
over directors); Griffin v. Patterson, 183 Okla. 108, 80 P.2d 246 (1938) (same; officers of
mutual insurance company). Contra, Wright v. Webb, 169 Ark. 1145, 278 S.W. 355 (1925)
(trustees of business trust).
In certain circumstances courts have permitted corporate officers to resign at the in-
stance of pecuniary gain when corporate directors not under the recipient's control deem
it in the best interest of the company. See, e.g., Mooney v. Willys-Overland, 204 F.2d 888
(3d Cir. 1953); Crespinel v. Color Corp. of America, 160 Cal. App. 2d 386, 325 P.2d 565
(1958) (noted in 28 U. CIN. L. REv. 380 (1958)); Ruffner v. Sophie Mae Candy Corp., 35
Ga. App. 114, 132 S.E. 396 (1926); Joseph v. Raff, 82 App. Div. 47, 81 N.Y.S. 546 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mem., 176 N.Y. 611 (1903).
93 445 F.2d at 1342.
94 The court did not even refer to the instant case, despite the benefit of hindsight
which showed that the Fund suffered badly under the direction of Moody's. See Lenzner,
Under New Management: From Lazard Freres to Moody's to Smith Barney, 52 BAaRON'S,
April 10, 1972, at 9.
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mon sense understanding of human nature is reason enough for the
application of the rule; when conflicts of interest develop, most resolu-
tions, consciously or not, are probably made in favor of financial self-
interest. The court, however, should perhaps have investigated possible
alternatives, if only to demonstrate that no other rule would provide
a different result from the sale of office rule, except those which give
a retiring adviser an economic incentive to choose the least desirable
candidate.
1. Rebuttable Presumption of Influence
An alternative rule, within traditional fiduciary analysis, would
permit the defendant in a challenged transaction case to prove that its
selection was uninfluenced by the compensation it received from the
chosen successor. This would relax the presumption of improper mo-
tive, which the sale of office rule necessarily creates, from an absolute
to a rebuttable presumption. Presumably, one way the burden could
be met would be to demonstrate that the successor was the best in the
industry. At first blush it would seem that such a showing would be
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of improper motive be-
cause it would either necessarily imply that the interest of the fund was
the uppermost criterion for selection, or prove that the fund could not
possibly have received a better adviser, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the selection process. But this alternative fails in several
respects.
First, objective, qualitative standards for measuring services
rendered by investment advisers have not yet been widely accepted. 95
If portfolio performance were the sole criterion, many administrative
and managerial qualities and services necessary to mutual fund opera-
tion would be left unjudged. Economists are not in agreement that any
one method of evaluation measures each adviser fairly. Many complex
variables, such as overall portfolio risk, investment objectives, and total
funds under management, make comparison of even performance
difficult. Given present methods, any analysis would inevitably turn
on subjective criteria, and the search for the best adviser would be
reduced to a value judgment.
But even assuming that economic theorists were able to refine
the comparative process to their universal satisfaction or that a court
was willing to submit the judgment to a jury, an interpretation would
have to be made as to whether the standard could be met only by a
95 See Welles, The Beta Revolution: Learning to Live with Risk, 5 INsritmxoNAL
INVESToR, Sept. 1971, at 21, 27, 52-55, 58, 62, 64.
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showing that the selected successor was the foremost candidate in the
industry or simply that it was the best potential adviser willing to
pay the sucession price demanded by the departing adviser. The second
interpretation would permit the retiring adviser to choose the highest
bidder, regardless of its qualifications, since it could raise the price of
succession until only a single candidate remained. The effect would be
to provide no safeguard for the selection process at all.
The first interpretation, requiring a showing that the nominee
was the best possible adviser, regardless of its willingness to pay the
desired price, would be the preferable alternative if it were not con-
strued to require the premier adviser in the industry despite that par-
ticular adviser's inability to assume the proffered position. A rule which
required the defendant to meet such an absolute standard would use
as its determinates factors unrelated to the conduct of the departing
adviser, and thus would overshoot its objective. A showing that po-
tential advisers thought to be superior to the eventual nominee could
not assume the position for reasons unrelated to the succession fee
should be sufficient to qualify the final choice as the best available.9
Another possible method of meeting the burden of proof required
of a defendant under a rebuttable presumption of influence rule would
be not to focus on the quality of the nominee, but to demonstrate that
the selection process itself was free from influence. It might be an
impossible task, given the proper skepticism of the judiciary evidenced
by the Rosenfeld court, to justify the selection process unless, as one
commentator recommends, the selection was made by someone other
than the retiring adviser. To avoid suspicion that the amount of suc-
cession fees offered by the candidates influenced the selection process,
this commentator suggests that "the adviser might wish to entrust to
the fund's independent directors the entire task of evaluating and
settling upon a successor."97 Presumably the scheme envisioned would
begin with the adviser informing the independent directors of its
desire to discontinue its advisory duties. The independent directors,
without aid or guidance from the adviser, would then scout or survey
the potential successors, choose the one most appealing, and leave the
bargaining of the succession fee to the two parties. This suggestion,
however, overlooks several considerations.
96 This interpretation, however, would not produce a different result than the sale of
office rule. A legal standard that required the best adviser to be selected regardless of the
succession fee it was willing or able to pay would permit such an adviser to refuse to pay
any fee at all. Such a rule, much like the Rosenfeld decision, would deprive the retiring
adviser of a succession fee.
97 Note, supra note 19, at 666.
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First, as a fiduciary to a fund, an adviser has the duty to seek the
appointment of a worthy successor.98 Fiduciaries are not released from
all responsibilities upon resignation. They are obligated to take steps
to ensure the smooth transfer of their position to the best available
successor. This principle seems particularly appropriate in the mutual
fund context where nearly all assets are highly liquid and potentially
volatile investment securities, funds are completely dependent upon
external management for day-to-day operations, and independent direc-
tors typically spend less than one full day a month considering their
respective funds' affairs. Advisers are far more familiar with the industry
and the attributes of a successful investment adviser than independent
directors who often only have personal knowledge of the adviser of their
own fund.
Second, courts have traditionally applied the same basic rule to
situations in which fiduciaries merely resign and, ostensibly at least,
take no part in the selection of a successor, and to those in which
influence is overtly exerted. Thus, the law has been rigid in prohibiting
fiduciaries, including corporate directors and officers, from resigning
at the instance of pecuniary gain.99 This stringent rule may stem from
a persistent belief that subtle or covert influence will be exercised to
install the payor.
Finally, even if the successor is selected by uninfluenced, indepen-
dent directors, no incentive remains for the payment of a succession
fee, other than to secure the retirement of the present adviser. The
identity of the recipient is irrelevant to the successor, as long as it se-
cures the opportunity to assume the advisory position with its attendant
management fees. Should independent directors be free to choose the
successor, they would then be in a position to demand the succession
fee, in the form of either lower future management fees or a lump
sum payment, for the benefit of the fund. Any payment to the adviser
would deprive the fund of that amount. Viewed in this manner, the
payment of a succession fee to the departing adviser would be a con-
scious bribe on the part of the independent directors to induce the
adviser to sever contractual relations, a step which the 1940 Act allows
on an ex parte basis to investment companies. 100
Adoption of this alternative, and thus permitting advisers to rebut
08 See 72 CoLum. L. REv. 580, 587-88 & n.59 (1972).
99 Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 114 N.W. 1047 (1908); Cox v. Berry, 19 Utah
2d 352, 431 P.2d 575 (1967) (dictum); T.F. Pagel Lumber Co. v. Webster, 231 Wis. 222, 285
N.W. 739 (1939); Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav. 360, 53 Eng. Rep. 937 (1858); Note, The
Law of Resignations, 64 U.S.L. REv. 351 (1930).
100 See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
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the presumption of influence, would not produce results significantly
different from the absolute prophylactic applied by the Second Circuit
in Rosenfeld. Such a standard might, in fact, create additional problems
if advisers sought to avoid some of their duties while attempting to
meet the burden of proof.
2. Probability of Harm
Courts have developed, primarily in cases dealing with sales of
controlling shares of corporate stock, another fiduciary standard which
subjects corporate fiduciaries to liability only if the circumstances sur-
rounding a transfer of the fiduciary position would have put a reason-
able man on notice that the buyers might use corporate assets for their
own benefit.101 This rule does not operate as a prophylactic, but requires
that the beneficiary, i.e., the corporation or minority shareholder, first
be placed in danger of harm.10 2
In 1966 the SEC recommended that a similar rule, designed espe-
cially for the unique structure of the investment company industry, be
enacted to apply to sales of management contracts or control. Speci-
fically, the Commission recommended that the Act be amended to
prohibit such a transfer "if the sale, or any express or implied under-
standing in connection with the sale, is likely to impose additional
burdens on the investment company or to limit its freedom of future
action."'103 Expressly contemplated were transfers in which purchasers
were to pay for the opportunity, at least in part, by directing fund
101 See, e.g., Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Bosworth v. Allen,
168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, referee's report con-
firmed, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct.
1941); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 85 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); cf.
Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
102 As a practical matter, of course, in most of the cases in which the standard was
imposed actual financial harm did follow the transfer. Courts applying the rule do not
focus on the mere existence of a succession fee or control premium, but consider the size
of such a payment as one of the factors which would arouse suspicion in the mind of a
reasonable man. One case found the premium alone enough to put the sellers on notice.
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S,2d 622, 658, referee's report confirmed, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) (investment company). If the succession fee could probably not be recouped within
a reasonable period of time from either any proper accouterments of control or an in-
creased value in the corporate shares due to improved management, the rule would hold
the seller liable for any harm resulting from the transfer. In some cases the measure of
damages would be the profits made by the seller. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp.
486 (D. Conn. 1957), on remand from 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 849 U.S. 952
(1955). See also Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HAIv. L. REV. 505 (1965); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAMP. L.
Rv. 1 (1956).
103 SEC 1966 REPoRT 152. The actual text of the legislative proposal was similar. See
H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15(a) (1967).
[Vol. 58:195
REWARD FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL RISK
brokerage to the seller or by forcing the fund to employ the seller or
its principals on particularly favorable terms. 04 Significantly, the SEC
stated that management compensation levels were within the scope
of the additional burdens test; instead, the Commission felt that its
simultaneously proposed test of reasonableness for management com-
pensation (later enacted in the 1970 Amendments under the alter-
nate rubric of fiduciary duty'0 5) would adequately police subsequent
management fees.10 6 But, apparently unaware of the conceptual diffi-
culties posed by these necessarily self-contradictory positions, the SEC
further proposed that the amount of the succession fee be disregarded
in any determination of the reasonableness of the subsequent manage-
ment compensation fee.' 07
The SEC proposal overlooked the fact that succession fees, which
the Commission was then able to recognize represented a capitalization
of future management fees, are themselves a form of management
compensation. Upon the enactment of the 1970 Amendments, this was
acknowledged, and the additional burdens test applicable only to
succession fees was deleted. Correspondingly, the standard of fiduciary
duty was applied to the determination of all management compensation.
The language of the amendment imposing the new statutory duty
"with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of pay-
ments of a material nature, paid by [a] registered investment company,
or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any
affiliated person of such investment adviser,"'108 however, might be read
to exclude succession fees, because the successor, not the fund, makes
the direct payment. But the fund and its shareholders eventually will
pay the amount through the management fee paid to the successor.0 9
Moreover, the legislative history makes it clear that the scope of the
statutory fiduciary duty was not meant to be so artificially restricted. 10
104 SEC 1966 REPORT 153.
105 New § 36(b), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
106 Cf. note 75 and accompanying text supra.
107 SEC 1966 REPORT 153.
108 New § 36(b), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
109 See text following note 75 supra.
110 The senate committee report on the Amendments stated the reasons for deleting
the additional burdens test and for the use of one standard for both management and
succession fees:
This section of [the Amendments] would have added a new section ... to deal
with problems raised by the transfer of management organizations. However, this
bill imposes a standard of reasonableness over management compensation and
extends the Commission's power to seek court injunctions against breaches of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct. Your committee, therefore, believes
that this provision . . . is unnecessary. A breach of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct in connection with the transfer of a management organiza-
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Thus, the statutory fiduciary duty does apply to succession fees; the
payment to the retiring adviser operates merely as a prepayment by the
incoming successor of the management fees to be paid to it by the fund
in the future.'1 '
Focusing solely on the likelihood that a fund would be harmed
by a change in advisers, the 1966 SEC proposal provided little safeguard
for the quality of the successor selected by the departing adviser. It
does not seem reasonable to credit the SEC with the creation of a rule
that did not contemplate any standard for the selection of the successor,
but implicit in the approval of the payment of any succession fee at
all is the notion that a selection standard be based, at most, only on
minimum qualifications. This is a necessary implication because if the
adviser were required to select the best available candidate, no fee
would be paid except at the instance of improper adviser domination.
Moreover, since the liability standard proposed by the SEC nominally
hinged on potential harm to the fund, the criteria for judgment of the
fitness of a successor would probably be reduced to the integrity of
the nominee, not its investment advisory qualifications, short of a
record of irresponsible or reckless management. An adviser which con-
sistently performed below the industry or market average indices would
not be eliminated from the list of potential successors. Thus, the pro-
posal would have not only given complete freedom to the departing
adviser to select a mediocre successor, but would have provided a
financial incentive to do so, since the poorer the performance record of
the candidate, the more attractive the opportunity to assume manage-
ment of an established fund should seem and the more it should be
willing to pay. Adoption of this alternative rule by the Rosenfeld court
would have permitted, if not encouraged, the selection of the least
desirable advisers.
D. Chief Judge Friendly's" Role for Independent Directors
By summarily rejecting alternative fiduciary standards that would
have the effect in the mutual fund context of rewarding advisers for
dominating the decisions of independent directors, the Second Circuit
tion would be actionable under [the new standard of fiduciary duty] in the same
manner as other violations of the statute. Your committee sees no need to single
out transfer situations for special treatment.
S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968); see 72 CoLum. L. Rav. 580, 589 (1972). But
see Butowsky, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Revisited-Moses v. Burgin and Rosenfeld
v. Black, 17 N.Y.L.F. 735, 762-63 (1971), and Eisenberg, Mutual Fund Litigation, 5 Rv.
SEc. REo. 909, 912-13 (1972), for the view that a burdens test was incorporated into § 36.
Ill Lipton, supra note 23, at 855.
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appears to be preserving, not abandoning, the concept of independent
directors. In this sense, the opinion exhibits a most sensitive judicial
understanding of the delicate role such directors are required to fill.
By placing the onus of selecting the successor on the adviser, the court
relieved independent directors of a judgment which would subject
them to great pressure from their respective investment advisers. The
court apparently recognized that in the absence of the absolute liability
test, independent directors would be faced in every transfer transaction
with enormous liability should they acquiesce in the award of a new
contract to the adviser-chosen candidate and permit the departing
adviser to receive a succession fee without at least demanding a similar
concession from the successor on behalf of the fund.
Despite helping to protect the integrity of the independent direc-
tor regulatory scheme by removing from the realm of independent
director action a determination sure to be fraught with sharp conflicts
of interest and large stakes, Chief Judge Friendly made it clear that he
does not envision a more limited role for the directors. Indeed, he sug-
gested that they must be ready to initiate affirmative action to dis-
continue contractual relations when present advisers' services put their
funds at a disadvantage compared with others in the industry. 12 By
requiring independent directors to exercise the full bargaining power
at their command, Friendly answered the argument that the imposition
of the sale of office rule would economically force old or disinterested
advisers to remain in their advisory positions to the detriment of the
funds they manage.
When Lazard began the Lazard Fund, an initial offering of shares
garnered an asset base of 114 million dollars. But Lazard did not have
its own captive sales force and apparently was reluctant to organize a
distribution network using independent broker-dealers. Thus, the Fund
did not have a continuous sale of its shares to the public. A second
offering, although initially contemplated, did not materialize, so by
virtue of occasional redemptions without offset by sales, the assets
dwindled to 85 million dollars in eight years. Without the incoming
cash produced by continuous sales, investments must be liquidated
once the cash cushion maintained by most funds is exhausted by
redemptions. Often this may force the sale of portfolio positions at
inopportune moments." 3 Apparently for this reason, and perhaps others
112 445 F.2d at 1347 n.14.
113 Romanski, The Role of Advertising in the Mutual Funds Industry, 13 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. REv. 959, 959-60 & nn.4-5 (1972); See Semi-Annual Report, T. Rowe Price
Growth Stock Fund, Inc., July 21, 1972, at 5.
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such as a rising expense ratio, Lazard decided that the Fund would
be better served if it contracted with another management company
which could offer the possibility of an ongoing sales program. The
independent directors were apparently told of Lazard's conclusion that
it was not serving the Fund's interest by remaining as the investment
adviser, because they approved of Lazard approaching Moody's to
negotiate the succession.
Lazard's actions were quite typical; advisers unilaterally determine
both when to pursue the possibility of transferring the advisory posi-
tion and whom to consider as a successor.114 Chief Judge Friendly
challenged "the implication that it is solely up to the adviser to decide
whether he will retire from that position in favor of a more effective
manager." 1 5 He cited those sections of the 1940 Act which require
annual renewal of the advisory contract by a vote of the independent
directors and permit termination of the contract by either the share-
holders or the board without penalty upon sixty days notice"10 as evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to afford only advisers the power
or the duty to make such decisions. Moreover, he reminded indepen-
dent directors that despite the prevalence of adviser domination, their
actions are judged separately and that they are "amenable to suit if
they discharge their annual approval function in a merely perfunctory
fashion."" 7 Turning to the Rosenfeld facts, he noted that the 1970
Amendments obligate directors to "request and evaluate" all informa-
tion necessary to make an intelligent and informed decision whether
to renew a management contract." 8 Thus, he determined that "if
Lazard was convinced that its unwillingness to engage in continuous
sales was detrimental to the Fund, and the independent directors be-
lieved this, they would have an affirmative responsibility to seek out
a successor." 119
Rosenfeld was not governed by the 1970 Amendments; the effec-
114 See notes 43-54, 63 and accompanying text supra.
In 1966 the SEC was apparently willing not only to accept this fact but to give its
approval to the attendant usurpation of independent director power. In support of the
additional burdens test, it proposed to govern transfers, arguing that succession fees were
necessary to prevent harm to funds with substandard advisers because "existing manage-
ment might be reluctant to surrender [the advisory] relationship and to provide the fund
with new and possibly more effective management." SEC 1966 REPoRT 152. Thus, the Com-
mission viewed succession fees as a therapeutic lubricant to encourage self-removal by poor
advisers.
115 445 F.2d at 1347 n.14.
116 1940 Act §§ 15(a)(3), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a)(3), (c) (1970).
117 445 F.2d at 1347 n.14, citing Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1961).
118 445 F.2d at 1347 n.14.
119 Id.
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tive date of their enactment postdated both the decision and its factual
setting. If they had been applicable, however, this largely overlooked
aspect of the decision could well have become the crux of the holding. 20
Arising as it did, the case gave the court an opportunity to warn
independent directors of the full reach of their duties. The thrust of
Friendly's remarks is dear: independent directors now have the duty
to consider annually obtaining management elsewhere, and, if it is
apparent that a switch in advisers will result in less harm or better
performance, they will be held accountable for failing to initiate steps
to implement such a switch. The decision must be based on a business
judgment, of course, and the factors favoring retention considered
above must be taken into account in the determination. But the inde-
pendent director's allegiance must be to the shareholders and must not
have been altered by personal or social ties with the adviser.121 The ex-
pectations of shareholders who purchase a particular fund's shares in
order to obtain the financial management of the adviser must be given
great weight, but as soon as it appears that considerations of sales loads
or personal tax consequences, rather than shareholder satisfaction with
performance or services, are preventing redemption,122 then indepen-
dent directors must act on the shareholders' behalf to secure new
management.
III
THE SALE OF CONTROL OF MANAGEMENT COMPANIES
Some commentators have interpreted Rosenfeld v. Black to pro-
hibit the receipt by shareholders of a management company of any
120 But see Lipton, supra note 23, at 856: "The next big surprise could be a suit
premised on failure to make new advisory arrangements where the investment performance
of the original adviser was poor for a substantial period."
121 Cf. Mundheim & Nutt, supra note 62, at 10: "An independent director cannot suc-
cessfully perform his role unless he recognizes that his sole loyalty must be to the share-
holders of the fund."
122 Sales loads normally consume about 8%-9% of a shareholder's investment. SEC 1966
REPORT 204. There is generally no redemption fee, but a switch to another mutual fund
which charges a sales load would be an investment cost to the shareholder. No-load funds
are becoming increasingly popular with mutual fund investors. A number of load funds are
switching to no-load status in recognition of the new, better-educated mutual fund
shareholder. See Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 5 (eastern ed.). In a no-load fund, sales
charges would not be a consideration for independent directors. The absence of a load
may permit retention of an adviser in a situation where were the fund a load fund
reasonable business judgment would preclude its retention. But even no-load fund direc-
tors must remember that each shareholder may suffer adverse tax consequences, insofar as
a change in advisers by a shareholder causes him to realize a gain or loss. On the other
hand, a change of advisers by a fund does not.
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payment in excess of the book value of the company upon the sale of
a controlling block of stock.123 This was the proposition urged by the
SEC, but not adopted by the Ninth Circuit, in the ISI case.' 24 The
Second Circuit, while distinguishing ISI on a technical point, rejected
the rationale of that decision. This may have led the commentators to
conclude that Chief Judge Friendly embraced the position urged by
the SEC in that case. But the unusual facts of Rosenfeld did not permit
him to address the question directly. It is necessary then to apply the
Rosenfeld analysis, which concentrates on the price and quality of
the services the fund will likely receive from a successor, to the sale
of controlling shares of management companies. 125 The following dis-
cussion will demonstrate that Rosenfeld does not mandate adoption
of the SEC position in ISI. It is helpful first to review the historical
developments of the law in this area and to contrast the reasoning of
ISI and Rosenfeld.
A. Prelude to ISI
The first interpretation of the effect of the 1940 Act on the legality
of the sale of controlling shares in a management company was an
opinion by SEC General Counsel Chester Lane in 1942.126 The owner
of a controlling block of stock sought Commission approval of a trans-
action in which a successor would pay him for the opportunity to
assume management of a mutual fund. Four alternate scenarios were
discussed, perhaps in an attempt by the SEC to demonstrate that the
form of the transaction would not be determinative of the governing
rule. In each instance the ultimate economic effect would be identical
to an assignment of the advisory contract, which, of course, would have
been inoperative under the Act. The four plans were: (1) sale of the
controlling block of stock of the advisory company; (2) resignation by
the current management and the subsequent award of a new contract
to the chosen successor by the management-controlled board; (3) merger
123 E.g., Keeffe, "Undivided Loyalty" Prescribed for Mutual Fund Managers, 58
A.B.A.J. 209 (1972).
124 For the thought that the court intentionally ignored the duties created by the
Act and the realities of the case before it, see Simpson, 1(b), or not 1(b), . . . 7: Recogni-
tion of Legislative Intent in Judicial Interpretation of Investment Company Act of 1940,
40 GEo. wAsri. L. REv. 890, 898-99 & n.49 (1972).
125 At least one court has not followed Rosenfeld. Kukman v. Baum, [Current Transfer
Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. 93,602 (NMD. Ill. July 9, 1972), held that the prophylactic
sale of office rule had not been incorporated into the Act. Instead, argued the court,
Congress in 1970 intentionally declined to alter the result of IS. See text accompanying
note 155 infra. For similar arguments, see Note, Mutual Control-Transfer Profits: Con-
gress, the SEC, and Rosenfeld v. Black, 58 VA. L. REV. 371, 394-406 (1972).
126 Investment Act Release No. 354, CCH FED. SaC. L. SEvy. 75,281 (1942).
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of the retiring and successor management companies; and (4) delega-
tion of management duties, without a concomitant assignment of man-
agement fees, to the successor for a given period of time.
Lane opined that each of the four alternatives was violative of
the Act and of the common law fiduciary duties incorporated in it. He
invoked section 15(d) 127 which provides for the termination of manage-
ment contracts upon purported assignment. Since section 2(d)(4). 28
defines "assignment" to include any transfer of a controlling block of
stock in the adviser company or the indirect transfer of the contract,
he reasoned that by "[1l]ooking through the form of the alternative
proposals" the transaction would be violative of the Act.u 29 This broad
reading of the Act was mandated by the legislative history, which he
found to contain "a clear Congressional intention to prevent all traffick-
ing in investment advisory contracts and to prevent an investment
adviser from transferring his fiduciary obligations by turning over the
management of the stockholders' money to a different person."' 30 Thus,
he interpreted those provisions which proscribe transfers of advisory
contracts to prohibit all transactions which accomplish the same practi-
cal result.
The opinion, however, did not rest solely on these sections of the
Act. Lane regarded the legal status of mutual fund investment advisers
as similar to that of fiduciaries, such as trustees and corporate execu-
tives, and reasoned that the sale of office rule would likewise be ap-
plicable. He decided that regardless of its orchestration the proposed
transaction would breach such fiduciary duty. This SEC opinion re-
mained the sole statement of the "law" for fourteen years.131
B. The ISI Case
In 1956 the SEC decided that a transaction involving Insurance
Securities, Inc. (ISI), warranted its intervention. The Ninth Circuit,
however, rejected the rationale of the Lane opinion. 32 Specifically, it
127 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(d) (1970).
128 Id. § 80a-2(d)(4) (1970).
129 Investment Act Release No. 354, supra note 126, at 75,698.
180 Id.
131 Industry adherence to its commands, however, was not unanimous. In April 1949,
Bertin C. Gamble sold to the Allegheny Corporation 57% of the voting stock of IDS, which
then managed three funds. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 50 S.E.C. 278 (1949). The staff
of the Commission charged, in part, that the sale of the stock violated § 36. The Commis-
sion, however, was more concerned with other issues at the time, and upon receiving
assurance that the boards of directors of the funds would consider the possibility of litiga-
tion did not press the point. Naturally no litigation ever resulted.
132 SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958), aff'g 146 F. Supp.
778 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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held that the sellers of a controlling block of stock in an advisory com-
pany do not violate the Act or any other fiduciary duty by receiving
a price in excess of the book value of the stock. Given the carte blanche
provided by this decision, many principal shareholders sold their
interests; in other cases, management company stock, often without
voting power, was sold to the public. 138
Four men founded ISI and its captive fund in 1938. By 1955 the
fund had accumulated assets of 215 million dollars, producing a
management fee of almost five million dollars for ISI. The manage-
ment company had no other business. On February 1, 1956, the found-
ers entered into a plan to sell 68,000 of their total 88,000 shares to a
small group of purchasers at fifty dollars a share, against a book value
of only $1.81. Another thirteen percent of the total 166,000 shares was
to be purchased from other shareholders.
The sale was carefully arranged. The transfer of the shares was
spread over a five month period ending July 1, 1956. The contract of
sale, however, called for consummation prior to an August 15 share-
holders' meeting. The meeting was held in order to re-award the
management contract which would be terminated by the sale of the
controlling block of stock of the management company. The proxy
machinery was still controlled by the ISI founders and the proxy state-
ment indicated that ISI "favored the reinstatement." The contract
award was approved by the shareholders and the sale was completed.
The Ninth Circuit, affirming the district court, dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim. In doing so, it apparently relied on
two alternative holdings. Unlike Lane, the court ignored the extensive
SEC 1940 Report.3 4 Instead, it looked only to the brief House 35 and
Senate 36 reports for its review of the legislative history. Those reports,
as well as one of the stated purposes of the 1940 Act,1a7 disclosed, the
court felt, that the only problem with which Congress was concerned
was change of investment company management without shareholder
consent, not profiteering by those who participate in the transfer. 38
133 SEC, 26Tm ANNUAL REPoRT 181 (1960).
134 See note 4, supra; cf. Tolins, supra note 4, at 91: "There should be some safeguard
against the sale of control and the election of a new board of directors without any notifi-
cation whatsoever to the [share]holders. Even with notice, control is not properly the sub-
ject of a sale."
135 HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON H.R. 10065,
H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
136 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CuRRENcY, REPORT ON S. 4108, S. REP. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
'37 1940 Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1970).
138 The pertinent problem with which Congress was asked to deal was not the
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Since shareholder approval was obtained, ISI's duties were fulfilled.
Moreover, the court reasoned that since Congress specifically addressed
itself to this problem, it intended the statutory provisions to be exclu-
sive. Thus, the SEC charge that everything over book value of the stock
sold amounted to a bribe for the sale of the fiduciary relationship was
held not actionable under the Act nor justification for relief under
common law. Alternatively, the court held that in the event that the
Act's provisions for shareholder consent were not the exclusive remedy
envisioned by Congress, any fiduciary duty ISI owed to the fund was
derived from the contractual relationship between the two. Since the
sale of the controlling block of stock automatically terminated the
contract by operation of sections 15(a)(4) 139 and 2(a)(4),'140 the fiduciary
office was vacated. Thus, since ISI had no office to sell, the rule was
inapplicable.
1. Exclusivity of Specific Provisions of the Act
Lazard, the defendant in Rosenfeld, also advanced these argu-
ments, but went one step further, suggesting that since shareholder
approval was obtained, the sale transaction was actually authorized by
the Act. 4 1 Congress should be credited, however, with the intent to
provide real, substantive safeguards for investment company investors
when it required their approval to effectuate changes in management.
Although history demonstrates that the existence of this theoretical veto
has never resulted in its actual employment,'142 it seems likely that
these provisions were intended to provide more than merely the form
of disclosure which proxy solicitation would produce, since the basic
thrust of the Act was to provide extensive federal regulation, not
simply disclosure.1' Indeed, it is probable that by prohibiting the
assignment of management contracts, Congress believed it would pre-
vent all trafficking in mutual fund control, and, a fortiori, any "prof-
excess price received for the sale of a controlling interest in the stock of invest-
ment advisors. Rather, it was the transfer of control of investment advisors ex-
ercising management functions, or their assignment of the service contract to
others, without the consent of the investors, regardless of the consideration re-
ceived therefor.
254 F.2d at 651.
139 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
140 Id. § 80a-2(a)(4) (1970).
141 Brief for Appellees at 12-38.
142 Studies completed prior to the enactment of the Act may have forewarned the
legislature of this ineffectiveness. For example, two commentators warned of the inefficacy
of shareholder self-protection. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, Tim MODERN CORPORATION AND
PnRvATE PROPERTY 277-87 (1932).
143 See Tolins, supra note 4, passim.
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iteering from such sales. '144 The numerous impediments to meaningful
shareholder participation and the ready acquiescence of independent
directors, of course, permit the economic equivalent of such sales to be
easily arranged, making the protection of such provisions illusory and
defeating the legislative expectation. The Ninth Circuit's limitation
of shareholder safeguards to those specifically enumerated in the Act,
therefore, frustrated rather than promoted the purpose of the legislation.
Friendly, on the other hand, tacitly adopted Rosenfeld's argument
that section 15(a) 15 was intended to reallocate corporate decision
making by removing from directors the sole power to approve the
effectual assignment of management contracts, instead of withdrawing
safeguards already afforded by equity. 46 Having concluded that
the statute's provisions were not meant to be exclusive, the court was
faced with three alternatives in applying the appropriate equitable
principles: (1) to hold that the applicable rule must be found in the
law of the state in which the federal forum is located under the
Erie147 doctrine; (2) to hold that section 36,148 then prohibiting "gross
abuse of trust," implicitly incorporated existing fiduciary duties into
the Act; or (3) to hold that the appropriate principles were impliedly
incorporated into section 15(a)(4)149 itself.
The court did not consider the second possibility. Obviously the
language of section 36 implied that persons subject to the 1940 Act
were obliged to adhere to some residuary fiduciary principles not
enumerated in specific provisions. Indeed, the 1942 SEC opinion inter-
preted section 36 as embracing the sale of office rule.50 Courts have
been loath to stigmatize businessmen as guilty of a "gross abuse of
144 Note, Protecting the Interests of Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-
Corporation Control (Or, Policing the Traffic in Other People's Money), 68 YALE L.J. 113,
131 (1958).
145 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
146 445 F.2d at 1344-45.
Sections 1(b)(6) (providing that it is in the national interest to prevent transfers of
investment company management without shareholder consent) and 15(a) simply
regulate the internal distribution of corporate powers within a fund. An advisory
agreement is a bilateral service contract; even at common law it could not be
assigned without the consent of the fund. . . . In the absence of a statute, the
consent of the fund could be given by its board; but § 15 of the Act lodges that
power with the shareholders. It is inconceivable that this internal shift of the
power of consent from the board to the stockholders should operate as a license
for the investment adviser to accept pay for the sale of its fiduciary office.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 5. See also Note, supra note 144, at 132 n.80.
147 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1988).
148 New § 36(b), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
149 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
150 See text accompanying notes 126-80 supra.
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trust." Friendly took care to remark that he "would not dream of sug-
gesting, much less holding, that Lazard's actions were so culpable."1 51
But if the bald sale of a fiduciary position of which the court found
Lazard guilty amounts to a breach of trust somewhere short of the
highly reprehensible conduct meant by "gross abuse," the Act would
not seem to provide a remedy.152
The first alternative also received scant attention from the court.
The opinion did note that reliance on a state-created claim would
produce the same result as the court's solution, because Rosenfeld also
charged that the proxy statements used to procure shareholder approval
were deficient and misleading, affording sufficient basis for pendent
federal jurisdiction. But its rejection of this alternative was premised
entirely on its justification for holding that the sale of fiduciary office
rule was impliedly incorporated into section 15(a). There was a con-
sideration, left unmentioned by the court but of practical consequence,
which may have provided additional reason for rejection of this theory.
Despite the court's apparent confidence, it is not at all clear that New
York, the source of applicable common law, had adopted the sale of
office rule. While relevant New York law is somewhat confused, at least
one case has refused to apply the rule to the seriatim resignation of
corporate directors pursuant to a sale of corporate control. 153 Perhaps
Friendly recognized this when he cited as support for his holding the
beneficial effect of providing uniform fiduciary standards for all invest-
ment advisers, regardless of the vagaries of local law.
Possibly to avoid the undesirable attributes of these two alterna-
tives, Friendly ingeniously held that when Congress extended the op-
portunity to approve or to veto successor advisers to shareholders, it
must have also intended that the proxy machinery be used only in a
151 445 F.2d at 1346.
152 Congressional recognition of judicial reluctance to invoke this standard resulted
in the moderation of the language to "a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal mis-
conduct" in the 1970 Amendments. Although the new, broader standard was not yet effec-
tive, the contents of the legislation were well known to the court. Perhaps the court accom-
plished a judicial acceleration of the effective date of the lesser standard; however, this
would seem a highly suspect purpose for its holding, particularly given that the broader
standard applies only to actions brought by the Commission. Nevertheless, the potential il-
legitimacy of the reasoning employed is buttressed by rumors which emanated from the
court's chambers following the release of the clerk's copy of the opinion and prior to the
publication of the official version to the effect that the court was seriously considering re-
moving the language exonerating Lazard of a "gross abuse of trust." Whatever the reason
for the court's failure to apply § 86 as it then stood, this defect has been strongly criticized.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 125, at 894-406.
153 Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y. 527 (1880); cf. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 805 F.2d
572 (2d Cir. 1962).
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manner that precludes influence on the adviser's recommendations
which may conflict with the best interests of the shareholders:
When Congress, in § 15(a), required shareholder approval of any
new advisory contract, it must have meant an approval uninflu-
enced by any improper motivations on the part of the outgoing
adviser-fiduciary .... [I]t is ... unthinkable that if a particular
state had chosen not to recognize the rule of equity here in ques-
tion Congress would have sanctioned an investment adviser's
profiting from using his influence in securing stockholder approval
of the appointment of a successor. 154
One court has expressly disagreed with this reasoning and held,
as ISI did, that no cause of action lies when a mutual fund adviser sells
its advisory position. In Kukman v. Baum,"r5 a federal district court
in Chicago found that Congress meant to adopt the ISI construction of
the Act when it failed to amend section 15(a) in the 1970 Amendments.
This holding implies, of course, the untenable conclusion that through
its inaction Congress intended to change the purpose of the Act from
providing more extensive protection for mutual fund shareholders to
eliminating the safeguards they enjoyed at common law prior to its
enactment.
2. Mechanical Operation of the Act
Lazard also argued, based on the second alternative holding of ISI,
that even if the provisions of the 1940 Act were not exclusive, the sale
of office rule had no application to investment advisers because the
sale of a controlling block of stock in an adviser (or the purported
assignment of a management contract) automatically terminated the
contractual relationship between an adviser and a fund. While con-
ceptually clever, this argument rests on a faulty understanding of
fiduciary relationships. The implicit notion that fiduciary duties are
incumbent only upon one who is contractually obligated to another
is erroneous: "A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the
interest of another person. It is immaterial whether the undertaking
is in the form of a contract." 56 Mutual fund sponsors create and
operate funds in such a manner that the shareholders are reliant upon
the sponsor's external management and administration. A momentary
hiatus in the contractual relationship produced by the unilateral action
of an adviser does not diminish this necessary reliance. By holding that
a sponsor can escape its fiduciary duties by acting in the very manner
154 445 F.2d at 1345.
155 [Current Transfer Binder] CCH Frm. SEC. L. REP. 93,602 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1972).
156 Scott, supra note 87, at 540.
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that Congress sought to prevent, the Ninth Circuit perverted the legis-
lative purpose of the termination provisions and ignored established
fiduciary principles.
Further, the ISI court apparently misunderstood the principle to
mean literally what its name states, i.e., that there be a "sale" of
fiduciary office. Except in unusual circumstances, the rule only has
effect in situations where a fiduciary does not have the power literally
to sell its position, simply because most fiduciary positions cannot be
unilaterally transferred by the fiduciary. For example, no corporate
executive can assign his office. A trustee, executor, or guardian cannot,
absent authorization in the dispositive instrument, appoint a successor,
nor can an attorney sell his practice. 157 In each case, the consent of the
company, beneficiary, or client must be secured. Of course, the recom-
mendation of the retiring fiduciary will in most cases convince the
board or shareholders to elect the nominee, the court or the beneficiary
to appoint the recommended successor, and the client to hire the pur-
chaser. In recognition of this, the sale of office rule seeks to prohibit
both the resignation and the use of a trusted position to influence
selection at the instance of personal profit. Thus, Friendly recognized
that the clever rationale of the ISI decision "proves too much," and
made short shrift of Lazard's contentions:
The role of Lazard, an organizer of the Fund[,] and its practical
control of the proxy machinery used to recommend the approval of
Moody's A & D as new adviser, made it quite as active and influential
as a corporate president who recommends a successor to his board
of directors, or a trustee who puts the name of a successor before
a judge. Indeed, the very fact of nonassignability demonstrates that
any payment made to the outgoing adviser by his successor in these
circumstances over and above the value of any continuing services
represents consideration not for lawful assignment of the contract
-which is prohibited-but primarily for the use of influence in
securing stockholder approval of the successor who expects to profit
from the post.158
3. Summary
The Ninth Circuit's use of reasoning premised on misinterpreta-
tions of congressional intent and misconceptions of the common law's
treatment of fiduciary relationships may have been prompted by its
reluctance to reach the same result that an application of the corporate
asset theory of corporate control would produce. Considerable judicial
187 See Sterrett, The Sale of a Law Practice, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 306 (1972).
'58 445 F.2d at 1344.
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dissatisfaction 59 with the corporate asset theory has been evidenced
since Berle and Means160 advanced the concept forty years ago. But ob-
jection to a questionable theory does not necessarily require a rejection
of its result. The Second Circuit better understood the dilemma and
realized that independent reasons, particularly the protection of share-
holder interests, mandated the result reached. Thus, the court dismissed
Lazard's protests that the sale of fiduciary office rule deprives it of an
asset which not only rightfully belongs to it, but which is properly
alienated at its leisure:
It is wholly immaterial that the prospect of receiving future man-
agement fees if it had continued as an adviser would have been an
asset of Lazard rather than of the Fund; the same would be true of
a trustee's right to receive future commissions or a corporate presi-
dent's right to receive future salary and other benefits. 161
Whatever the reasons for the ISI court's use of such a rationale, its
holding that a retiring investment adviser retains no fiduciary duty to
the fund it abandons has been repudiated both by the 1970 Amend-
ments, which recognize a duty to the fund with respect to the receipt
of all management compensation, 12 and by the superior reasoning of
Rosenfeld. Its demise gives occasion for a fresh look at these duties in
the sale of a controlling block of stock in an adviser. At the same time,
by recognizing the need for fiduciary standards when the right to man-
agement fees is being transferred, Rosenfeld provides the focal point
for our consideration. Its concern with the price and quality of sub-
sequent services afforded mutual funds following such a transfer will
be the guiding principle in the following analysis.
C. The Rosenfeld Analysis Applied
Sitting as a review court, the Second Circuit could not determine
as a matter of fact whether the undertakings of Lazard were a sham to
conceal what Rosenfeld contended was the true purpose, the sale of the
advisory position. The holding, therefore, was necessarily limited to a
determination that if the various covenants were a sham, as the plain-
tiff alleged, a cause of action was stated. The case was remanded to the
district court for such a finding.163 The court of appeals did not, how-
ever, instruct the trial court how to make such a determination. Pre-
159 See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. RFP. 93,342 (7th Cir. 1972).
160 See note 142 supra.
161 445 F.2d at 1343.
162 See new § 36(b), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
163 445 F.2d at 1350.
[Vol. 58:195
REWARD FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL RISK
sumably the court would follow familiar, albeit criticized, examples, such
as valuing the undertakings and subtracting this amount from the total
consideration. Regardless of how the determination is made, the thrust
of the holding strongly suggests that where more than merely a man-
agement contract is transferred, the seller can receive compensation
for all other objects of worth.164 For example, if a management com-
pany were being transferred by means of a sale of its assets, the sellers
could properly receive compensation for all the tangible assets sold.
Similarly, where the transfer takes place through a sale of stock, the
value of the proportional amount of the company's tangible assets that
bears the same relationship as the quantity of stock sold does to the
total management company stock outstanding can be properly paid to
the sellers.165 But operating companies have more assets than their
books and tables. Intangible assets, such as goodwill or going concern
value, have a real market value. Nevertheless, the mere characteriza-
tion of an element of worth as an asset does not end the analysis. As one
court, faced with a challenge to a transfer similar to that in ISI, has
recognized that "[i]f there was payment for sale of control of [a mutual
fund], it cannot legally be justified as payment for an element of value
belonging to the [management company] stock."'016 Thus, it must be
determined which of these conceptual assets can be sold consistent with
the Rosenfeld prophylactic analysis.
1. Goodwill
In 1966, with the publication of its mutual fund report, the SEC
retreated from its earlier position on changes of management company
control. Despite expressing continued dissatisfaction with the ISI de-
cision and recognizing that significant danger existed to mutual fund
investor interests from management self-interest, the Commission never-
theless drew the new conclusion that the application of the sale of
office rule would deny
retiring management any compensation for the elements of value in
the relationship [with the fund] which they may have built up over
the years... [and thus that] existing management might be reluc-
tant to surrender that relationship and to provide the fund with
new and possibly more effective management.167
164 Cf. Butowsky, supra note 110, at 764.
165 This was, of course, admitted even by the SEC in ISI, although the Commission
also contended that the proper measure of those assets was their book value.
166 Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 61, 72, 173 A.2d 626, 633 (1961), on rehearing,
40 Del. Ch. 151, 177 A.2d 203, af'd, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
167 SEC 1966 REPoRT 152.
1973]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The defendant in Rosenfeld argued that this amounted to explicit
acknowledgment by the SEC that goodwill was an asset of the adviser
which might properly be sold. While Friendly never specifically ad-
dressed this argument, his analysis, of course, impliedly rejects it.
The SEC's suggestion is premised on the notion that because of
the psychological and practical impediments to effective arm's-length
bargaining by independent directors, most changes of management are
initiated by advisers, not by the fund. Making a value judgment that
it is better to permit the seller to bargain with whomever it wants for
whatever price it can obtain than economically to lock the adviser into
the relationship, the suggestion capitulates to the commanding posi-
tion many advisers have constructed through the appointment of
friendly directors and the placement of administrative machinery in
their own, rather than a fund's, corporate entity. But Rosenfeld was not
ready to accept this frustration of the purposes of the Act. Apparently
realizing that the SEC position anomalously rewards advisers exercising
a lesser standard of care for their initial disregard for the standards
originally envisioned by the Act, the court rejected the implication
that an adviser should be accorded unlimited discretion in the deter-
mination of its own tenure.
The concern of the court for the prophylactic effect the depriva-
tion of personal gain would have on the selection of a successor clearly
runs counter to the mutual fund report proposal. In balancing the
two competing interests-reward for entrepreneurial achievement and
protection of the price and quality of investment advice for investors
-the court apparently believed the latter to be more important. In-
deed, the court seems to suggest that, unlike other industries where
the fiduciary principle need not be applied so stringently (because the
interests of management and the investing public do not clash so force-
fully and the cost of investment liquidation is not so great), economic
incentives have no proper place in the retirement and selection process.
Thus, the bargaining process itself is the root evil at which the rule was
directed.
Finally, the assumption that the relationship between an adviser
and a fund is the product of mutual goodwill generated and built up
over the years is without basis. Goodwill is generally defined as the
value of the probability of continued business or patronage. 1 8 Yet, in
the mutual fund industry, the expectancy of the continuance of the
relationship is not derived from mutual business respect and admira-
168 This legal definition is often said to have been created in Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves.
Jr. 335, 346 (1810) (per Lord Eldon).
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tion as it is in industries where dealing is on an arm's-length basis. It
is produced, instead, by the power the adviser exercises over the fund.
The probability-if indeed it is not a certainty-of annual contract
renewal is just as great at the inception of the relationship as it is
many years later. It is improper to consider the expectancy of renewal
to be "built up." It is this self-created control of the business decisions
of a fund that permits the seller to bargain for a price that reflects a
capitalization of future income, without any discount for the possibility
of loss of patronage. Thus, goodwill is not an asset for which an adviser
can be paid.
Failure to recognize the unique relationship between an adviser
and a mutual fund can result in misguided judicial approval of the
sale of goodwill. An example is the case of Krieger v. Anderson.1 69
Suing derivatively in a Delaware state court on behalf of a fund, a
shareholder charged that the sale of the stock of the fund's investment
adviser at a price reflecting a capitalization rate of approximately thirty-
seven times annual earnings was a sale of its fiduciary office and the
usurpation of a corporate opportunity of the fund. The trial court
summarized the plaintiff's argument as follows:
The fair value of the stock where a sale of "control" shares of a
management company is involved is tested by the price a willing
buyer and a willing seller would reach; since such a sale would ter-
minate the management contract, a willing buyer would not be
willing to pay anything approximating its value in the. hands of
the seller unless he was assured of renewal of the management con-
tract; therefore, payment of the difference is evidence of payment
for improper action taken to insure the renewal of the service con-
tracts. 70
Rosenfeld, of course, accepted this line of reasoning, agreeing that the
automatic termination of the management contract merely underscored
the use of influence and proxy machinery by the retiring adviser. On
appeal, however, the Krieger court rejected these arguments on two
grounds. One demonstrates the court's misunderstanding of the adviser-
fund relationship, which is typified by the lack of arm's-length bargain-
ing. The other illustrates the court's misconception of the respective
interests of an adviser and the shareholders of a fund in the growth of
the fund's size through sales.
The defendant shareholders argued that if they received only a
"fair" price for their shares, their fiduciary duty to the fund could not
169 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct.), aff'g 40 Del. Ch. 151, 177 A.2d 203 (1962),
on rehearing from 40 Del. Ch. 61, 173 A.2d 626 (1961).
170 40 Del. Ch. at 153, 177 A.2d at 204.
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have been breached. In a masterstroke of artful advocacy, they urged
that a fair price would be the same price that minority shareholders
not selling a controlling block would receive. The plaintiff, Krieger,
was forced to concede that noncontrol shares of other advisory com-
panies were generally selling at prices reflecting a price-earnings ratio
similar to that received by the defendants. He argued, however, that
control shares would have a lower value than noncontrol shares, be-
cause upon their sale the contract-severing provisions of the Act became
operative. He suggested that the difference between the purchase price
and a deflated value which control shares should enjoy was in fact the
premium for control and use of the proxy machinery that the fund
should recover.
The court acknowledged that permitting control shares to be
valued equally with noncontrol shares allowed the seller to receive
consideration for the value of the expectancy of contract renewal.
Nevertheless, since the sale price was the same as the current market
price for individual shares, the court reasoned that nothing could have
been paid specifically for the use of the proxy machinery in order to
secure renewal, and, accordingly, that there could be no violation of
the sale of office rule. The court failed to consider, however, that the
market price of individual shares probably reflected the marketplace
expectation that annual renewal was a certainty because of the domi-
nance of the adviser. Hence it endorsed the illicit peddling of fiduciary
influence merely because the practice had become commonplace. Con-
sideration should have been given to the fact that even the price of
noncontrol shares reflected a premium for control of the fund, since
the ongoing contractual relationship would continue without regard
to the provisions of the Act enabling the fund to terminate the relation-
ship when conditions would properly warrant.
In a cogent review of this problem, an eminent securities law prac-
titioner has suggested that goodwill should be marketable when it can
be demonstrated "to the independent directors of the fund that the
fund is receiving a benefit commensurate with the value of the expec-
tancy payment to the retiring adviser." 1" Another commentator also
believes that in a sale transaction where there is continuity of manage-
ment, such as when "the former chief executive officer of the adviser,
its portfolio managers, research analysts, and administrative personnel
continue to serve the [fund] after the transaction," the Rosenfeld
rationale will not be violated because "the directors can exercise sound
business judgment in approving a fee that is not reduced by the amount
171 Lipton, supra note 23, at 855-56.
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in the excess of the tangible asset value plus the value of the adviser's
organization absent the contract received by the selling shareholders."'172
White v. Auerbach173 apparently followed this second suggestion
sub silentio, using the term "human assets." In ruling on the reason-
ableness of a settlement offer made by defendant sellers, the district
court subtracted the estimated value of the skills and abilities of a key
management executive and other personnel who were retained by the
purchasing adviser from the total payment in determining the amount
paid for the fiduciary office.
The fallacy in such reasoning is that in foregoing a fee reduction
or the receipt of a premium the fund is paying for a benefit the Act
allows it to obtain for free. It should make no difference whether the
successor is a newcomer or merely the same management company
under new ownership. By directing the value of that benefit to them-
selves, the defendant controlling shareholders in Krieger, as the plain-
tiff charged, usurped a business opportunity properly belonging only
to the fund.
The 1940 Act is not concerned with changes of either adviser per-
sonnel or names. Its protective mechanisms are activated only when
changes occur in advisory company control. This implicit awareness
that important policies and investment philosophy can be changed by
new owners without a change in personnel militates for the use of a sim-
ilar standard whether the advisory organization personnel remain essen-
tially the same or whether a totally new adviser succeeds to the posi-
tion.
The second ground for the Krieger decision was best expressed in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware:
[W]e observe that the approval of plaintiffs contention would lead
to an anomalous result. Owners of stock of a management company
who have built up the value of their shares through the years by
the exercise of business ability and good judgment are forbidden
ever to reap the reward of their labor. In other words, they can
never sell the shares for what they are really worth. This conclu-
sion offends one's sense of fairness. If overriding considerations of
public policy requires [sic] a curb on the right of owners of man-
agement contracts to realize the full value of their assets, it is for
Congress to say so.174
Despite the smug implication that Congress would never pass a law
172 Nutt, supra note 47, at 245.
173 [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,602, at 92,774 (N.D. Ill.
July 9, 1972).
174 40 Del. Ch. at 367-68, 182 A.2d at 910.
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that would offend the Delaware court's system of values, the 1940"Act
stands as evidence that Congress apparently has. The court's objections
are more properly addressed to those provisions of the Act which deny
cheap stock to mutual fund promoters and permit mutual funds to
cancel advisory contracts without penalty, rather than to the plaintiff's
interpretation of the latter's operation. In answer to the protests of the
court that Kreiger's arguments would prohibit owners of management
contracts from realizing their full value, the Act specifically proscribes
the indirect assignment of management contracts and warns that tenure
is at best guaranteed for only sixty days. The 1940 Act rejects the im-
plication that mutual fund management contracts are vendible capital
assets in the hands of advisers; Krieger was correct in demonstrating to
the court that they have no true alienable worth.
More important, the court misunderstands the nature of manage-
ment fees and overlooks the conflicts of interest they present. Invest-
ment company investors, unlike their counterparts in industrial con-
cerns, do not always share the same interests as management in the
growth of their companies' assets. The value to management of a freely
marketable contract would be largely dependent upon the size of the
management fee it produces. But since the amount of assets under
management can be increased either by capital accretion or by sales,
the fee operates to reward sales as well as performance. Under Krieger
or ISI, the worth of a management company's shares would reflect in
large part the ability of the sponsor to mount an effective sales cam-
paign. Data are inconclusive, but most industry observers do not believe
that the large size of a fund necessarily benefits individual shareholders.
Although sufficient assets are needed to meet investment objectives,
such as portfolio diversity, economic theorists believe that no material
diversification benefit accompanies ownership of more than twenty
securities. 175 Also, brokerage costs per invested dollar are likely to de-
crease with growth, because greater funds permit larger positions in
any one issue. Some economists believe, however, that many funds are
so large that meaningful portfolio positions are impossible; investment
is required in too many different securities, effectively removing dis-
cretionary judgment and reducing the fund to an unmanaged pool at
the mercy of general market conditions. 7 6 Moreover, liquidity is dif-
175 See Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1613
& n.42 (1971) (collecting conclusions of various studies).
176 SEC 1966 REPORT 263. This finding was questioned in SEC, INsTIruTONAL Invas.
TORS SrUty REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 8, at 31 (1971). The latter
report noted "the lack of a significant relationship between fund size or advisory complex
size and fund performance." Id.
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ficult to obtain without severe market fluctuations disadvantageous to
the fund because each portfolio position is so relatively large that its
disposition (and occasionally acquisition) disrupts normal supply and
demand levels. Block traders and third market makers have developed
remarkable talent in facilitating these trades, but they charge handsome
premiums for their services. Thus, the sale of shares may be more im-
portant to the interests of the adviser than to those of the shareholders.
The Krieger rationale improperly rewards advisers for efforts which
may have in fact retarded the performance of the fund and harmed the
shareholders.
2. Voluntary Shareholder Renewal
It has also been suggested that while the sale of office rule properly
prohibits profiting from the use of influence, sellers of management
company stock should be permitted to receive a sales price that reflects
the value of "the chance that the investors [will] voluntarily reinstate
the contract.'I 77 This theory argues that if the services of the manage-
ment company had been satisfactory and the sale changed only the
ownership of the adviser, not its personnel, then shareholders would
most likely continue the relationship. Since no investor expectations
would be frustrated, payment for "that portion fairly attributable to
the anticipated earnings of an organization capable of performing valu-
able services"'1 8 would properly reward the sellers for the full value of
their assets without exposing shareholders to possible harm.
This theory would appear to give desirable deference to the fact
that investors choose a particular mutual fund primarily on the basis
of the reputation of the adviser. Moreover, if the theory were extended
to newly constituted advisers, as it theoretically can be, it would reward
retiring principals who select the best successors obtainable, since the
chance that well-informed shareholders would vote to renew the con-
tract would increase with the quality of the buyers. The argument,
however, rests on the untenable assumption that shareholders can exer-
cise concerted, well-reasoned control over the renewal procedure. The
practical impediments to effective shareholder democracy are over-
whelming. Shareholder approval of any candidate nominated is almost
a certainty. If a court were to determine the chances of renewal realis-
tically, the resulting reduction in the sales price would be infinitesimal.
Moreover, the effect of such a determination would be to give undue
meaning to the ritual of shareholder ratification, a result Congress
177 Note, supra note 144, at 129 (emphasis added).
178 Id. at 130.
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specifically sought to prevent in the 1970 Amendments.179 Realizing
that the power to place the successor's name on the proxy is tantamount
to approval, Rosenfeld rejected this approach and triggered adviser lia-
bility, in part, upon the use of the proxy machinery. It held that share-
holder ratification would be effective only if shareholders were informed
that they were entitled to the profit and that the vote must be unani-
mous to bind the fund.80 On the other hand, if a court were to recog-
nize these obstacles to independent shareholder judgment, it would be
forced to predict what a hypothetical body of intelligent, informed
shareholders would do in a similar case.
Perhaps similar considerations have persuaded courts to apply the
sale of office rule in situations where fiduciaries merely resign at the
instance of personal gain and have not sought to influence the selection
of their successor. Whatever the merits in other circumstances, in the
mutual fund context such application properly recognizes the power
that control of the proxy machinery carries and obviates the need for
proof of specific examples of the use of influence on fund directors.
Rosenfeld, however, phrased the duty in conditional terms, pos-
sibly implying that had Lazard remained aloof during the selection
and approval process, it could have received whatever succession fee it
could negotiate. The court, however, was skeptical that such a situation
would ever arise:
It will be time to deal with the unlikely case where the adviser re-
tires or the controlling stockholder sells his interest in the advisory
company at a profit but scrupulously avoids any involvement with
the required approval of the new contract, when it arises.18 '
While the bargaining position of the retiring adviser is substantially
reduced when it does not control the selection process, such a case, or
at least the staging of such a case, is not so unlikely as the court believes.
Commentators and practitioners have suggested that selling shareholders
179 Prior to the 1970 Amendments, courts in effect held that shareholder approval of
a contract award removed any fiduciary duty of an adviser with regard to management
compensation. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962). See also Hear-
ings, supra note 55, at 608 (remarks of Chief Judge Friendly: shareholder voting provided
no protection against adviser overreaching). Congress added § 36b(2) to provide that ap-
proval of management contracts by shareholders "shall be given such consideration by the
court as is deemed appropriate under all the drcumstances." This was intended to make
ratification only one of many factors to consider-not controlling as earlier courts had held.
S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1969). Now "it is unlikely that courts will give
much weight to ratification as a determinant of fairness." Note, supra note 17, at 648.
1S0 445 F.2d at 1343.
181 Id. at 1347 n.13.
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may avoid liability if they play no role in settling upon a successor. 8 2
But these suggestions ignore the fiduciary duty of the adviser to make
its disinterested recommendations to the independent directors. To
permit the sellers to receive a price which includes the hypothetical
value of voluntary renewal, regardless of their role, would leave the
same opportunities for abuse that Rosenfeld sought to eliminate and
would undercut the purpose and principles of the fiduciary obligations
the opinion imposed.
3. Ex-Fund Going Concern Value
Analytically, the denial of the value of either goodwill or the chance
of voluntary shareholder renewal to selling management company
shareholders, and, ultimately the sale of office rule, are in part the prod-
ucts of the equitable prohibition against a fiduciary profiteering from
its relationship with its beneficiary. It follows that it would be entirely
proper for the selling shareholders to be compensated for the value of
the management company without the mutual fund relationship. In
some cases this will include the value of a firm's goodwill in other
capacities, such as investment banking or underwriting, but in many in-
stances it will be limited to the worth of an operating management or-
ganization capable of advising other mutual funds not presently under
management and similar pools of investment assets, such as endowment
and employee benefit funds. This element of worth will be called ex-
fund going concern value.
The logic of this analysis with regard to the value of an adviser's
goodwill in businesses other than investment management can be tested
if we alter the facts of Rosenfeld88 slightly. Suppose that instead of
Lazard withdrawing from the management relationship, the principal
owners decided to sell their controlling interest in the entire company.
Since Lazard had not formed a subsidiary to manage the Fund, such a
sale would have triggered the termination of the advisory contract. But
Lazard derived only a small portion of its total revenues from the ad-
visory relationship. To prohibit the selling shareholders from receiving
more than the tangible net asset value of the firm would be to deprive
them of the value of intangible assets which are in no way connected
with the operation and management of the fund, a result neither re-
quired nor contemplated under Rosenfeld.
Even those advisers that have no business other than advising
182 See Lenzer, supra note 22, at 44; Note, supra note 97, at 666.
183 See text following note 82 supra.
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mutual funds have value as a going concern distinct from their rela-
tionship with funds presently under management. A history of proven
performance and low-expense ratios can make an adviser quite attrac-
tive to an investment pool looking for new or improved management.
Competition for pension and retirement fund advisory contracts is cur-
rently quite intense, and, unlike the mutual fund situation, advisers are
frequently changed.1 14
The fact that competing mutual fund advisers are presently unable
successfully to bid for and win management contracts, replacing other
sponsors, should not diminish ex-fund going concern value. Courts
must distinguish between the actual and the ideal practices in the
industry. A court in agreement with Rosenfeld's rejection of the cur-
rent edge which advisers enjoy as a legal model might well approve a
larger allocation of value for this component than the marketplace
would otherwise assign to it.185
Allocation for this element of worth should be restricted, however,
by two considerations. First, compensation for ex-fund going concern
value is only proper where the purchaser acquires the benefit of the ad-
viser's name, personnel, and organization. When a key management
184 Several large pools have begun hiring two or more advisers to manage their funds.
See Rohrer, Everybody Wants to Split-But How Are They Going About It?, 5 INsrrru-
TIONAL IuvasroR, Aug. 1971, at 64; A Splitting Sampler: How 40 Major Companies Spread
the Money Around, id., Oct. 1971, at 69. The better performing advisers are then rewarded
by the allocation of a larger proportion of the assets to their control, thus raising their
management fee. Unsatisfactory performers are fired if their service does not improve with
fewer assets under management. Even The Common Fund, a college endowment fund,
has begun to screen prospective advisers and select multiple managers. See Address by
J. Meck, The Selection of Investment Managers for The Common Fund, Donaldson, Lufidn
and Jenrette Endowment Conference, New York City, May 1971.
Presently, advisers affiliated with New York Stock Exchange members have an ad-
vantage in bidding for such positions because the parent can make healthy profits solely
from handling the brokerage of the funds, enabling the affiliate to offer very low or
nominal advisory rates. However, new proposals to lower the level of negotiated brokerage
commission rates and an awakening sense of fiduciary duty to obtain the best execution
on behalf of a fund may open the field to independent advisers.
185 Ex-fund going concern value should also include a recognition of the successful
public offerings of new mutual funds. Such offerings have become more common in recent
years. In the Rosenfeld case, for example, the Lazard Fund amassed $115 million in assets
without the benefit of an ongoing sales program. Several years ago Jerry Tsai was able
to assemble assets totaling close to $300 million in the public offering of his Manhattan
Fund. The weak market of the last few years has not foreclosed this marketing technique.
Recently, Massachusetts Financial Services, which normally employs Vance, Sanders &
Company for continuous underwriting and sales, has used Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. for the initial public offering of two new mutual funds. Merrill Lynch de-
livered over $300 million in new assets. An established name in investment management
may be able to use this technique and duplicate these reults. Ex-fund going concern value
should properly reflect these possibilities.
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officer does not continue to serve after the sale or does so only in a
limited capacity, such as a consultant, or when the name recognition
factor of the company is lost, as, for example, in a transaction staged
as a merger, the evaluation of this component should reflect such loss."8 6
Second, when an advisory organization manages a complex of
mutual funds, care must be taken not to permit the selling shareholders
to profit from the effectual assignment of management contracts with
the other funds comprising the complex. Allocation of the value of the
renewal of advisory contracts with other funds would reward the sellers
for the use of proxy machinery to secure shareholder approval. More-
over, since the danger of adviser domination would exist in each fund,
particularly where independent directors sit across the complex,8 7
serving on each board, the need for a prophylactic rule to protect the
integrity of the Act would be as great as in a single fund evaluating
the overall goodwill of its adviser. The evaluation of ex-fund going
concern value, therefore, should not reflect consideration of other in-
vestment company clients then under contract.
4. Summary of the Rosenfeld Analysis
The net effect of Rosenfeld is to deny promoters any opportunity
for the receipt of entrepreneurial reward for promotional efforts in de-
veloping new investment vehicles in the form of investment companies,
at least when they withdraw from their role as sponsor and investment
adviser or sell control of the advisory company. Receipt of compensa-
tion equivalent to the value of the advisory organization they have
developed is permitted, but this cannot reflect the relationship of the
advisory company to the mutual funds it has sponsored or come to
manage. This result will undoubtedly further one avowed purpose of
the 1940 Act, which was to discourage the creation of investment com-
panies for quick profit rather than for long term management. 88 Since
the only remaining avenue for earning entrepreneurial reward is the
management fee, prospective promoters may be reluctant to sponsor new
funds unless they feel that they are prepared to undertake a long term
188 In the Rosenfeld situation, Moody's was promised the services of an economic
consultant for five years and the best efforts of Lazard "to induce certain persons presently
performing services for the [Fund] to similarily perform for Moody's Capital Fund." 445
F.2d at 1839-40. While Lazard should receive the worth of these individual covenants,
nothing resembling an ongoing organization changed ownership. Payment designated for
going concern value, therefore, would have been improper.
187 Cf. Glazer, supra note 81, passim.
188 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 252-54 (1940) (remarks of D. Schenker, SEC counsel).
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commitment.18 9 The entrepreneur who is content to recoup the invest-
ment of his time and effort over a lengthy period, however, may find
that even this source of entrepreneurial reward will be denied if per-
formance as an adviser does not merit his retention.
Left unsettled are the procedures to be used to evaluate the largely
hypothetical and speculative ex-fund going concern value of an adviser.
The difficulties presented are formidable-perhaps so incapable of
precise solution given the current state of techniques of financial ap-
praisal that the SEC and Senator Harrison Williams devised S. 4071,190
at least in part, to avoid the need for such an appraisal by removing
some of the incentive for paying a succession fee.
IV
S. 4071: THE NEWEST LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The recently proposed S. 4071191. would specifically permit an ad-
viser or its shareholders to receive a succession fee if two requirements
were met. First, S. 4071 requires that at least seventy-five percent of the
governing board of a mutual fund consist of independent directors for
a period of three years following a sale.192 Second, a sale transaction
must not impose "an unfair burden" on a fund. 98 The bill would ex-
empt a transaction in which an adviser "goes public," selling its shares
to unrelated investors and retaining the individuals in actual control of
the adviser.194 A final provision, though not a condition to the approval
of receipt of a succession fee, may potentially be the most important
facet of the bill. This provision would prohibit the new, post-sale board
from considering the succession fee paid by a new adviser in its evalua-
tion of the terms of the management contract.19 5 Undoubtedly, the bill,
189 This hesitancy may become an absolute deterrent given the high percentage of
initial failure for promotion efforts. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
190 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
191 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC Reform Bill]. The bill was
introduced in the Senate on October 9, 1972, by Senator Williams on behalf of the SEC.
See 118 CONG. REc. S91 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1972) (statement of Senator Williams); Speech by
Senator Williams before the Securities Industry Ass'n, Sept. 7, 1972, reprinted in BNA
SEc. REG. & L. RP., No. 108, Sept. 13, 1972, at D-1. The bill, entitled the Securities Act
of 1973, was introduced, in part, as a replacement for S. 3681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),
which had been introduced in Congress on June 7, 1972, by Senator Williams. Since the
Commission is presently taking a "no comment" position, it is unlikely that the SEC will
protest its own alterations of the original text which are found in S. 4071.
192 SEC Reform Bill § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. § 6 (proposed addition to 15 US.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970)).
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if enacted, would provide some protection for both mutual fund share-
holders and advisers; however, in order for the bill to fully accomplish
its objectives, it must be clarified and amended in several respects.
A. Principally Disinterested Boards
S. 4071 is the second bill drafted by the SEC dealing with succes-
sion fees to be introduced in Congress. The first, S. 3681,110 closely
parallels the present proposal in approach; the latter, however, incor-
porates several changes, one of which deals with the composition of
mutual fund boards of directors. S. 3681 called for a fund to have a
wholly disinterested board for a period of five years following a sale. 97
SEC Commissioner Sydney Herlong stated that the purpose of S. 3681
was to prevent an investment adviser or its shareholders from receiving
any succession payment "reflecting the certainty of succession to and
assurance of continuation of the investment advisory contract."' 98 That
bill was to reduce the amount paid in excess of the worth of an adviser
without regard for its mutual fund advisory position by requiring a
totally independent board which would presumably be resistant to im-
proper adviser influence.19 Thus, a successor "would have to bargain
with the investment company at arm's length"; continuation of advisory
relationships would be dependent upon proven performance and ser-
vice.20  The SEC did believe that sellers should "be able to receive some
payment reflecting the real going concern value of the adviser."20' 1
This provision in S. 3681 met with much criticism from representa-
tives of the mutual fund industry who felt it was "an unduly harsh re-
striction, and could result in additional costs to the funds because of the
need to hire new people not connected with the management com-
pany."202 Apparently recognizing that stiff opposition on this one point
could endanger the many other reform measures included in the bill,
Senator Williams, who introduced the bill in Congress, softened the
requirements. Significantly, however, he did not change the framework
of the original proposal or its intended effect.
The Act has always provided that for advisory contract award and
100 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1972).
197 Id. § 3 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. 80a-16 (1970)).
198 Herlong 11.
199 The introduction of a wholly disinterested board was expected to restrict "to a
fair value the consideration which a purchaser would be willing to offer for the stock or
assets of the retiring adviser as a viable entity." Id. at 12.
200 Id. at 11-12; Casey Letter.
201 Herlong 11.
202 118 CONG. Ric. S17,219 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1972) (statement of Senator Williams).
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renewal only the votes of independent directors have any effect.2°3
True, directors were previously permitted to "avoid responsibility for
approving a disadvantageous advisory contract by leaving the approval
to a majority of the outstanding shares," 204 but with the enactment of
the 1970 Amendments, the Act mandates that such determinations be
made by the independent board members in person at a meeting called
for that purpose.20 5 Thus, for contract award and renewal all mutual
fund boards in effect are now wholly disinterested, and, in theory at
least, a successor must bargain at arm's-length with the independent
members of a mixed board. This aspect of S. 4071 demonstrates a recog-
nition that unaffiliated directors of forty percent independent, bifur-
cated boards presently do not provide such bargaining on behalf of
mutual fund investors.
The SEC has previously recognized that independent directors do
not always perform the extensive role seemingly provided for them in
the 1940 Act.200 For example, during congressional consideration of the
1970 Amendments, an industry trade group proposed an alternative to
the statutory imposition of a fiduciary duty on advisers which would
have increased the required number of independent directors on an
average board from forty percent to at least a majority. The SEC re-
jected this enforcement method. A member of the Commission staff
commented that "by relying upon measures to strengthen the number
and the independence of the unaffiliated directors, the industry was
propagating the myth that unaffiliated directors have served as an effec-
tive control over advisory fees." 207 Neither the bill, Senator Williams,
nor the SEC, however, make clear why the cure for this ill is to be a
larger dose of the same tonic. The only objective result of a change to
principally independent boards would be the theoretical removal of
proxy control from advisers. This might permit independent directors
to oppose adviser practices without fear of being removed from the
slate of nominees at re-election time.
Another change required by S. 4071 may be intended to eliminate
a major influence on the outlook of independent directors. In the invest-
ment company industry, advisers generally make (or at least can veto)
the selection of independent directors. As one prominent securities
lawyer noted: "[T]he men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs
203 1940 Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. 80a-15(c) (1970).
204 Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1347 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971).
205 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 8(c), 84 Stat. 1413, amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15(c) (1970).
206 See Hearings, supra note 55, at 674-80 (statement of M. Cohen, Chairman, SEC).
207 Id. at 46.
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to watch them."208 S. 4071 requires that only the independent directors
pick the successors to ousted interested directors.209 Of course, there is
no guarantee that nominally independent directors who were selected
by an adviser are going to choose men who will serve solely in the in-
terests of fund investors. Indeed, this may by the unlikely case.
Independent directors who prior to succession acceded as a matter
of course to other adviser demands would probably honor recommenda-
tions of new board members made by a seller or buyer. Moreover, those
directors brought onto the board by a departing adviser may desire to
retire from the board rather than to attempt to establish a working rela-
tionship with a new and foreign organization. S. 4071 dearly contem-
plates close monitoring and continual evaluation of the performance of
a new adviser in the years immediately following a succession, perhaps
requiring more time-consuming work than a director may have come to
expect. Furthermore, even those directors who have maintained their
independence, but who anticipate leaving the board upon a transfer,
could be expected to look to a successor for suggestions for nominees in
order to provide directors familiar with its personnel, organization, and
operations, since little continuity of board membership would be main-
tained.
Despite the existence of boards comprised primarily of unaffiliated
persons, the development of directors' psychological independence
would probably require either adviser assistance or a lengthy working-
out period in which identification with adviser interests gradually
diminishes as boards evolve away from direct adviser selection. Since
it is in an adviser's interest to maintain a board sympathetic to its
interests, many funds may not receive the necessary sponsor assistance.
However, some of the most successful and respected advisers in the
industry have voluntarily divorced themselves from the selection pro-
cess for independent board members, leaving the entire task to un-
affiliated directors. Some successors may develop truly independent
attitudes, but in the majority of cases the evolutionary process to true
independence would probably take longer than the three year period
provided in S. 4071.210 If, as seems likely, an adviser is still able to in-
fluence director nomination after the statutory period, the bill would
permit it to install its representatives on the board and to gain absolute
control of the proxy machinery.
208 Conference on Mutual Funds 739 (remarks of A. Pomerantz, plaintiff's counsel in
Krieger, Rosenfeld, and Newman v. Stein). See also Nutt, supra note 47, at 215-19.
209 SEC Reform Bill § 7 (proposed amendment of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970)).
210 Id. § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
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Even if S. 4071 does produce truly independent boards and fund
control of proxy machinery, it cannot police the quality of successors
in the very sale transactions which trigger its operation. A new adviser,
unlike new directors, is not required to be selected and nominated
solely by unaffiliated members of the board. Nor must a newly con-
stituted board be elected prior to board consideration of a successor.
According to Commissioner Herlong, the legislation contemplates that
"the new adviser [will] be initially approved by the outgoing board."21'
This mechanical flaw casts grave doubt on the ability of the proposal
even theoretically to accomplish its goal of eliminating any payment
reflecting certainty of succession, since installation of a new, less in-
terested board would come only after a successor had been approved
by the old board, and the outgoing adviser (still in control of the proxy
machinery) had solicited shareholder approval. Thus, a retiring adviser
could exert as much influence in the operative sale transaction after
adoption of the bill as it is presently able to do.
The rationale offered by the SEC for requiring more independent
directors does not explain why such directors are considered necessary
only after succession. If, as Commissioner Herlong has stated, the
principal purpose for removing interested directors and replacing them
with unaffiliated persons is to provide arm's-length bargaining, it would
be equally appropriate to mandate such bargaining throughout the
existence of a fund, since management compensation is paid during
this entire period. There is one explanation that may justify this
otherwise anomalous result. When a mutual fund investor selects a
particular fund, he does so primarily to secure the investment manage-
ment skills of the adviser of that fund.212 In a very real sense, he seeks
only a personal relationship with that one adviser. The investment risk
he willingly assumes is justified by his trust in the talents of his chosen
adviser. As long as that original adviser remains, the investor will be
subject only to risks typical of most investments. If he becomes dis-
enchanted with portfolio performance, he may redeem his investment
and seek out another adviser (although in load funds at costs somewhat
higher than in direct common stock investment). Senator Williams and
the SEC may believe that in such an instance an investor should be
satisfied, except in cases of egregious adviser misconduct, to rely solely
on redemption to obtain new investment management, since an ad-
viser's interest in remaining in the relationship that it created in order
211 Herlong 10.
212 Both proponents and critics of the shell theory agree on this. See Lobell, supra
note 56, 70 YALE L.J. at 1260-62; Nutt, supra note 47, at 232; WHARTON REIORT 343-44.
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to earn entrepreneurial reward outweighs the interest of the investor
in obtaining a low cost change.
On the other hand, when an adviser retires from the relationship
on its own initiative, the mutual fund shareholder, unlike the invest-
ment adviser's individual client, must unwillingly incur both the costs
of a sales load and possible tax consequences that would accompany a
switch to another adviser if he is dissatisfied with the retiring adviser-
selected successor. True, he does have the right to vote against a recom-
mended successor or (should it come to pass) a competitor adviser, but
he must accept the candidate selected by a majority of his peers. The
nature of his investment is thus materially changed from reliance on
his personal choice of investment manager to reliance on the board of
directors of the investment vehicle to which he is wed to ensure that he
receives the best possible portfolio performance. In other words, as
long as the adviser he chose manages his money, he should bear the
risk of his selection, but when that adviser leaves and his investment
expectations are disappointed, his investment risk is changed and his
interest becomes solely a maximization of return. Thus, he is entitled
to receive closer and disinterested scrutiny of an adviser from the
board which can more easily seek new management in the event of
substandard performance.
This rationale, though appealing, does adopt much of the reason-
ing of the shell theory which has so often been rejected by the SEC and
Congress.218 That theory undermines the bargaining position of fund
directors by removing their principal bargaining tool with regard to
management fees-the power to terminate the relationship. The 1970
Amendments, however, placed new duties on independent directors to
police the compensation advisers receive. Adoption of this rationale
would undercut the purpose of those Amendments. Moreover, if this
rationale were the basis of S. 4071, the bill would have the curious effect
of changing the duties of directors in situations with which it does not
purport to deal. It would be anomalous to change the role of indepen-
dent directors in pre-transfer situations with an amendment dealing
only with post-transfer periods. Furthermore, the bill would operate
with only the roughest form of justice for successor advisers. Those
investors who purchased fund shares for three years following succession
in order to obtain the successor's services will receive more than they
bargained for-the investment management of their choice and a
primarily independent board capable of arm's-length bargaining.
Finally, it is inconsistent with the rationale proffered to allow a
213 See notes 57-62 and accompanying text supra.
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retiring adviser to select a successor. An investment adviser would not
be able to force an individual client to place his portfolio with another
adviser chosen by it, nor could it assign its personal investment advisory
contract. It is conceivable, however, that the drafters of S. 4071 believe
that the adviser would be prohibited from taking any role in the selec-
tion of a successor.214 Rosenfeld reasoned that when the legislature re-
quired shareholder approval of new advisers it must have meant ap-
proval uninfluenced by financial self-interest on the part of a retiring
adviser which is in control of the proxy machinery.215 The drafters may
have intended Rosenfeld's holding to be left unchanged by S. 4071,
permitting an outgoing adviser to receive a succession fee only if it
allows independent members of an outgoing mixed board to select a
new adviser as well as new directors. That additional requirement,
however, would appear to contravene the bill's express approval of a
succession fee (albeit solely upon the simultaneous institution of a wholly
disinterested board and the absence of an unfair burden imposed on a
fund). Moreover, abstention from the selection process may be in viola-
don of the fiduciary duties an adviser owes to a fund. If the drafters in-
tend the bill to change these common law duties, specific indication
should be made in the amendment.
A better method of preventing unbridled adviser selection would
be to alter the bill to mandate the installation of a principally indepen-
dent board prior to a succession. If proposed subsection 15(f)(1)216 re-
quired that, in addition to three years following an effectual assignment
of an advisory contract, the board of a fund be staffed principally with
unaffiliated persons six months prior to a succession, absolute control of
the proxy machinery would be removed from a retiring adviser, pre-
venting it, at least theoretically, from being able to guarantee succession
for the candidate of its choice and thus bargaining for that guarantee's
worth. Six months should provide the new board with sufficient time
to scan the industry, survey past performance records, receive bids, and
conduct interviews with prospective successors. With this change, a
succession fee would be reduced (except for ex-fund going concern and
tangible asset value in a sale of stock) to merely a "suggestion fee."2T
214 The amendment would not visibly alter § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970), the
provision held by Rosenfeld to incorporate the equitable proscription against personal gain.
215 445 F.2d at 1344.
216 SEC Reform Bill § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
217 Of course, the new board could choose not to solicit the outgoing adviser's counsel,
but if it- did, the difference in market value between a suggestion and a succession fee
would lie in the extent to which new boards in fact exercised independent judgment. The
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This characteristic of S. 4071 which permits advisers to present new,
principally disinterested boards with new advisers as a fait accompli,
together with the express approval of the receipt by sellers of "any
amount of benefit"218 in connection with transfers, appears to con-
template the abolition of any standard of quality (other than honesty)
for an adviser's choice of a successor. Freedom to bargain for the highest
price obtainable and to choose the identity of a successor presumes no
duty to select the best candidate; conceivably, an outgoing adviser
could select a complete novice whose integrity was impeccable. Ad-
mittedly, the 1940 Act would permit discontinuation of the advisory
relationship by a new board in such a case. But since the purpose of
the bill is to make continuation of the relationship dependent upon
performance, it is likely that the bill contemplates that once installed,
a successor will be given an opportunity to prove itself. In order to
provide a fair trial period, a board would have to wait at least three
or four years to evaluate properly the portfolio performance. Thus, in
bargaining for the succession fee, an outgoing adviser could ignore the
short notice termination provisions of the Act219 and demand an amount
reflecting the present value of the anticipated profits for the trial period
without any discount for the possibility of loss of the position.
In sum, the independent director facet of S. 4071, as presently
written, would not prevent an outgoing adviser from demanding pay-
ment for guaranteeing the succession to an advisory position and the
present value of the profits from the first few years of the relationship.
Nor would the bill prevent an adviser from selecting the highest bid-
der rather than the best potential successor. At best, it would only
operate to limit slightly the amount of consideration a successor is
willing to pay, since after the trial period negotiations with a new,
principally independent board might carry a higher degree of risk of
termination or unfavorable terms than those with a conventionally
comprised board. The success of even this limited result would depend
in large part upon advisers assisting, against their own self-interest, in
the development of truly independent boards.
development of a pattern of strict adherence to the choice of retiring sponsors would force
courts to require financial appraisal and allocation to separate the ex-fund worth of the
adviser and the price of its influence. Should boards demonstrate a pattern of independence,
however, courts may not wish to bother with such guesswork, despite the fact that an
adviser may be selling its influence, since the amount which would be allocated to this
component would be minimal.
218 SEC Reform Bill § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
219 1940 Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-39 (1970).
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B. Publicly Held Advisers
Certain dangers inherent in a negotiated sale of advisory company
control are not present in a public sale of stock. Fund shareholders
are not subject to being placed in the hands of the highest bidding suc-
cession candidate. The effective management of their investment will
remain under the direction of the same personnel they selected. Even
when key executives do leave an adviser simultaneously with a public
sale, their replacements will have probably gained their positions by
prowess rather than purchase--often through internal promotion. If the
only object of mutual fund shareholder protection were the quality of
investment management, public sales of advisory company stock might
well be permitted to go unregulated, as S. 4071 would allow22 0 in a
provision not included in its predecessor, S. 3681.
However, whether management identity is changed or not, sellers
of advisory company stock always capitalize on the company's advisory
relationship. The selling price of such stock, of course, will be greatly
influenced by the profitability of the adviser. Selling stock to outsider
shareholders puts new pressures upon adviser principals to maximize
profits. Public shareholders will be interested in the best return possible
on their investment, rather than in the welfare of fund shareholders. As
Chief Judge Friendly has recognized, in such a case "the price paid for
the stock would inevitably figure in any efforts to reduce the manage-
ment fee. '22 1 Principals will assume new fiduciary duties to these public
shareholders. Those who may have been willing to forego certain cost
saving moves or higher fees when they were sole owners may now be
under new legal duties to refrain no longer from maximizing profits.
Furthermore, principals who plan to sell more of their own adviser
stock may be tempted to maintain the market price of the stock at high
levels by delivering large dividends to adviser shareholders at the ex-
pense of a fund. Finally, principals who have retained little voting stock
may fear a proxy fight from adviser shareholders and a consequent loss
of their executive positions. The cost of investment management may
be adversely affected when adviser stock is sold to the public. That pro-
vision of S. 4071 which would exclude public sales of adviser stock from
the Act 222 should be deleted from the bill.
Even without the enactment of such an exemption clause, a ques-
tion remains as to the applicability of the present provisions of the 1940
Act which govern management contract assignments. Should manage-
220 SEC Reform Bill § 2 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970)).
221 Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 697 n.19 (2d Cir. 1972).
222 SEC Reform Bill § 2 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970)).
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ment company stock be sold, the Act demands that a "controlling block"
be transferred before the advisory contract is considered "assigned," 2m
and the advisory relationship is thus automatically severed.224 Share-
holders, therefore, need not be solicited nor do independent directors
need to vote in order for the relationship to be continued when less
than a controlling block is transferred.
An interpretive problem arises. When stock of a company previ-
ously closely-held is sold, even in large amounts, to widely dispersed
and unrelated public investors, control of the issuer can be maintained
by those in control of the proxy machinery at the time of the sale. In
Newman v. Stein,225 the voting stock of the Dreyfus Corp., investment
adviser to Dreyfus Fund, Inc., was sold publicly by its principal share-
holders; yet, the chief operative officers and management personnel were
able to continue in command of the company. The selling shareholders
of Dreyfus were subsequently sued derivatively by a fund shareholder
who relied on Rosenfeld charging, inter alia, that the sale of stock
constituted a sale of fiduciary office, and who sought recovery of the
profits derived from the sale. Rosenfeld incorporated the equitable
principle requiring abnegation of personal profit in the transfer of a
fiduciary position into section 15(a).226 Since that provision is applicable
only when a sale of adviser stock constitutes a transfer of a controlling
block, arguably at issue was whether a controlling block was sold at all.
Curiously, the Act does not define "controlling block." Courts227 and
commentators,228 however, have generally thought the Act's definition of
"control" related directly to this provision. "Control" is defined as the
"power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or
policies of a company. '229 Without more, the Act would not appear to
be operative and the Rosenfeld rule would be inapplicable in the New-
man case, since practical control was retained by the same principals.
But the Act further provides that an owner of twenty-five percent or
more of voting stock of a company shall be presumed to have control
of that company.230 The contrary presumption applies to the owner of
223 1940 Act § 2(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(4) (1970).
224 Id. § 15(a)(4), 15 US.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
225 See Newman v. Stein, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,316
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972).
226 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
227 See, e.g., Phillips v. SEC, 388 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1968).
228 See, e.g., Comment, Termination of Management Contracts Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 733, 739 (1963).
229 1940 Act § 2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1970).
230 Id.
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less than this percentage.231 The trial and appellate courts both ignored
the issue. The sale of Dreyfus stock clearly did constitute transfer of a
block in excess of twenty-five percent of its voting securities. The pur-
chaser, however, did not receive a "controlling block," nor did any one
purchaser or related group of buyers receive a twenty-five percent block.
Thus, not only was the presumption of control arguably not met, but,
in fact, no control changed hands.2 2
The result reached in the Newman case is a desirable one. The con-
tract termination provisions of the Act, and hence the sale of fiduciary
office rule, should apply to public sales of adviser stock. The theory ap-
parently relied upon to suggest such a rule in both the Newman case
and the Act, however, is questionable. A transfer of control does not
necessarily occur simply because more than twenty-five percent of an
adviser's voting stock is sold.233 In order for control to change hands,
the buyer must receive a controlling block of stock. Indeed, it is quite
conceivable that a purchaser could acquire a "controlling block"
through several sales, none of which was itself substantial. As long as
control is the trigger for contract severance, courts should focus on what
the purchaser received rather than what the vendor sold.
The Act should be amended so that transactions such as the Dreyfus
sale do trigger its operative provisions. The presence or absence of a
transfer of control should not be the determinative factor. Instead, the
mere sale of adviser stock should be the sole trigger of Rosenfeld or S.
4071 liability. Formulation of an amendment incorporating this objec-
tive, however, is complicated by the desirability of certain sales within
management. Many transfers between controlling shareholders or ex-
ecutives would be innocuous or would actually benefit a fund. Sales
which permit a greater number of management personnel to share in
the profits of an adviser may stimulate more active interest in the per-
formance of the fund an adviser manages.234 The desirability of permit-
231 While these presumptions are rebuttable, evidence must be initially presented to
the SEC for its determination. The sellers in Newman apparently did not solicit the Com-
mission to- challenge the statutory presumption of control; instead, they sought share-
holder and director approval of the transaction and renewal of the advisory contract. If
the court or the parties believed the sale constituted a transaction triggering the Act
because the selling group no longer held 25%, they improperly allowed the Act's rebuttable
presumption to contradict the realities of the transaction. It would seem that the
presumptions are rebuttable for just this kind of case.
232 Despite the obvious difference in results, the trial court, nevertheless, assumed that
"[tjhe facts here are essentially similar to those in [ISI]." [1971-1 972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. at 91,720.
233 Cf. Lipton, supra note 23, at 855-56 (ownership limited to key adviser employees
benefits fund).
234 Comment, supra note 228, at 744-48.
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ting this alignment of work and reward would suggest allowing some
internal shifting of equitable ownership. This method of transfer, on
the other hand, should not be used by founding principals to capitalize
on the advisory relationship. When they withdraw, entrepreneurial risk
must no longer be rewarded. If their successor principals have paid a
succession fee, resistance to a proper reduction in management fees can
be expected. In order to balance these competing interests, S. 4071, in
addition to those alternatives detailed above, should be modified to
amend section 2(a)(4) of the Act to define "assignment" to include any
sale of adviser stock (voting or nonvoting) to persons other than those
actively engaged in management. In contrast to sales to outsiders, the
regulation of internal sales of adviser stock should focus on the amount
transferred, not the amount received, since the danger lies in selling
shareholders capitalizing their rights to future fees. Thus, in addition to
the general transfer of control definition, all sales of stock by insiders in
excess of a fixed amount, say ten percent, should be included in the
statutory definition of "assignment."
Many advisers are already publicly held. The marketplace, as
Krieger285 demonstrates, values advisory company stock, often in the
face of disclosure of the short guaranteed duration of management con-
tracts, presuming contractual relationships with funds will continue in-
definitely. In this sense, the sales price of all publicly traded advisory
company stock includes a succession fee. Should independent directors
of funds whose advisers have gone public lower advisory fees now that
those funds' founders have reaped their entrepreneurial reward? The
burden of such a reduction would fall not on a successor which has pur-
chased an advisory position, as it would in a negotiated transfer, but on
the public shareholders of the adviser. A reduction in management fee
rates would severely decrease the market value of these shareholders'
stock, because almost the entire entrepreneurial reward profit stream
would be eliminated. It would be possible to derive profit only as a
reward for outstanding performance and efficient service. Little incen-
tive would exist to provide a return on the succession fee the public
shareholders paid. Despite this harsh result, as between the two inno-
cent groups, adviser shareholders and fund shareholders, the mutual
fund investors have the better of the equities.
First, adviser shareholders have been put on notice in their pros-
pectuses that the continued right to profits from advisory relationships
is not certain. Admittedly, many prospectuses probably have not warned
235 Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct.), aff'g 40 Del. Cl.
151, 177 A.2d 203 (1962), on rehearing fron 40 Del. Ch. 61, 173 A.2d 626 (1961).
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that the management fees the issuer earns may drop as a result of the
immediate sale. However, if this was a misleading disclosure, adviser
shareholders should have recourse against the sellers.
Second, even assuming that public purchasers of advisory stock
could not be expected to anticipate a lowering of management fees, the
adviser shareholders should bear the loss since they took the action
which created the problem. This loss (despite once appearing very re-
mote) is part of their investment risk.
To ameliorate this harsh result, adviser shareholders may argue
that to the extent a fund recovers the seller's profits from a sale through
litigation, the advisory fees should remain at their previous levels. This
may seem an equitable solution, but it would impose undesirable financ-
ing costs on fund shareholders. Since sellers would likely be liable to
purchasers and to the funds they formerly managed, it seems better to
let adviser shareholders seek restitution from their vendors with priority
to the sellers' assets. Mutual fund directors should ignore any such re-
covery in their calculation of management fees.
C. Payment of Entrepreneurial Reward
Two provisions in S. 4071, one prohibiting the imposition of bur-
dens on mutual funds and the other regulating the post-sale manage-
ment fee, may together dictate that entrepreneurial reward be paid
only through management fees.
1. Unfair Burden
The principally disinterested board provision attempts only to in-
sert some of the economic effects of arm's-length bargaining into trans-
fers of advisory positions; it does not purport to regulate any other
aspect of such sales. Accordingly, the drafters apparently considered a
residuary fiduciary standard necessary. In order for sellers to receive a
succession fee, S. 4071 would further require that a sale transaction not
impose an "unfair burden" on a fund.2 6 Commissioner Herlong has
explained that "unfair burden" is to be defined by the 1966 Mutual
Fund Report.23 7 That report discussed 28 8 proposed subsection 15(g)
which was eventually deleted from the 1970 Amendments. Subsection
15(g), would have prohibited transfers which had terms likely to im-
pose additional burdens. "Additional burdens" were specifically thought
to include agreements to direct fund brokerage to the seller's broker
236 SEC Reform Bill § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
237 Herlong 10.
238 SEC 1966 REPoRT 152-53.
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affiliate;239 S. 4071 expressly defines "unfair burden" to include similar
agreements.24 0 But neither of these definitions is meant to be exclusive.
The scope of the phrase "unfair burden" is uncertain;2 41 on its face it
does not necessarily share the identity with subsection 15(g) that Com-
missioner Herlong suggests.
First, unlike the 1966 proposal, S. 4071 contains no language sug-
gesting that liability hinges only on a showing of potential harm. While
subsection 15(g) would have prohibited any transaction "likely" to
cause harm, the new proposal requires only that "there is not imposed
an unfair burden." Thus, recovery under the new proposal may be con-
ditioned upon the occurrence of actual harm to a fund. The unfair
burden requirement, however, does extend to "any express or implied
terms, conditions, or understandings" with respect to a sale.242 In light
of Commissioner Herlong's remarks suggesting that the two standards
were intended to be similar, a court might reasonably consider a sale
agreement containing terms which were likely to harm a fund to be the
kind of risk that imposes an unfair burden on a mutual fund. In doing
so, of course, the court would be attributing the error of very sloppy
draftsmanship to the drafters. The absence of such language more prob-
ably suggests that liability was not meant to result from an anticipatory
showing of harm and that actual injury must be demonstrated to estab-
lish a violation.
A second possible difference between the 1966 recommendation
and S. 4071 is the nature of the burden or burdens that must result
from the sale to create grounds for liability. The Commission's change
from "additional" to "unfair" may signify that here too a less rigorous
standard of care may now be contemplated. The natural import of
"additional" suggests that the 1966 test would have made unlawful sales
which would impose any new burden or cost on a mutual fund; in con-
trast, S. 4071 would seem to permit a seller or buyer to impose "fair"
costs on a fund. In other words, enactment of the new bill would evi-
dence congressional belief that certain types of burdens caused by a
change in advisers should be borne by mutual fund shareholders.
239 Id. at 153.
240 SEC Reform Bill § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
241 The Investment Company Institute proposed a draft that would have subjected
parties to the sale of an advisory position to liability only when the transfer imposed an
"undue burden" on a mutual fund. For the text of the draft, see Newman v. Stein, 464
F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972). Chairman Casey stated that the SEC has "trouble with the ap-
proach taken by the [Investment Company Institute proposal] because of the difficulties
we see in determining what constitutes an unfair burden." Casey Letter. Nevertheless, the
phrase was used in the SEC draft.
242 SEC Reform Bill § 5 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)).
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Finally, the change to the singular "burden" in S. 4071 from the
plural "burdens" in subsection 15(g) may indicate that the fairness of
the transaction is to be judged on the basis of its overall effect, permit-
ting burdens to be offset by benefits; in subsection 15(g) each potential
cost or injury was occasion for liability. Unfortunately, the new pro-
posal does not indicate, nor has the SEC suggested, what types of bur-
dens or what costs could permissibly be placed on mutual funds by
sellers or buyers of advisory positions. The proper interpretation of this
provision will probably depend in large part on the method to be used
for board determination of the reasonableness of management compen-
sation.
2. Subsequent Fee
In ascertaining the role of the unfair burden provision, another
provision of S. 4071 must be considered.243 That provision regulates not
the sale itself, but the post-sale board evaluation of the terms of a man-
agement contract with a successor. As an amendment to section 15(c) of
the Act, it would make unlawful the consideration by mutual fund di-
rectors of any succession fee paid an adviser with regard to their evalua-
tion of an advisory contract. This provision is apparently intended to
have two interrelated effects on the deliberations of a board. First, di-
rectors are not to feel bound to retain an unsuccessful successor so that
it can recoup its succession fee. More important, board members are
not to consider the size of a succession fee as a relevant factor in negotia-
tions with respect to the management fee.
3. Incremental Review of Management Compensation
In practice, the effect of these two parts of S. 4071 is largely deter-
mined by the method independent directors must now use to evaluate
management compensation. The 1970 Amendments considered the
method for such determination. Prior to enactment of the Amendments,
advisers and directors attempted to justify, and courts often upheld, fee
rates, in part because the particular fee in question did not deviate sub-
stantially from prevailing rates in the industry.2 One-purpose of the
Amendments was to reject the circular reasoning of such an approach
and to require that the reasonableness of each management fee be judged
in relation to its own particular circumstances. Directors are now obliged
243 Id. § 6 (proposed addition to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970)).
244 See Rottenberg, supra note 17, at 325-33; Note, supra note 17, at 633-36. Chancellor
Seitz noted that a court was unlikely to find that all the funds in the industry were paying
unreasonable fees. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 488-89, 184 A.2d 602, 611-12 (1962).
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"to request and evaluate" all information necessary to judge'the
reasonableness of management compensation. The original version of
the Amendments included a nonexclusive list of items deemed neces-
sary to such a determination.245 The version eventually enacted did
not contain that list, but the purpose of the Amendments-to require
an incremental review of each component of a fee-was not changed.
True, it is unlikely that many boards presently break down the manage-
ment fee for consideration. No mutual fund prospectus, for example,
explains for what service or risk each management fee dollar is awarded.
Without dissection and independent evaluation of each component,
however, intelligent review is impossible, and fees paid without regard
to such an evaluation are suspect. 246
S. 4071 deems the capital investment, a successor makes in a suc-
cession fee to be an improper factor or component for board members
to consider. If they used an incremental review of each component of
a management fee, directors would necessarily award a successor ad-
viser a lower fee than its predecessor received, since a significant part
of the compensation paid the outgoing adviser would have been justi-
fied on the basis of providing it with reasonable entrepreneurial reward.
The successor, despite undertaking by definition an equal amount of
risk, would have as its vice the principal portion of its risk in the form
of capital, rather than effort.
Such a diminution in the available risk profit stream would have
significant economic effects upon succession. Since an advisory position
would bring income only slightly more than adequate to reimburse
reasonable expenses and pay a reasonable wage, no opportunity would
exist to earn a return on the succession fee capital expenditure. The
desire of potential successors to pay an outgoing adviser for the op-
portunity to succeed to an advisory position would be severely damp-
ened. In effect, management of a fund would become nearly internalized.
Admittedly, efficiency would permit higher net earnings. Ongoing
operation risks of management would entitle successors to remunera-
tion higher than that offered in similar jobs of commensurate respon-
sibility where tenure and income are more secure. Moreover, superior
portfolio performance would properly increase compensation, perhaps
by means of a performance fee.247 But these three potential sources of
additional compensation would probably not provide enough oppor-
245 The list is reprinted in Hearings, supra note 55, at 8.
240 See Nutt, supra note 47, at 232, 238-48.
247 See id. at 246.
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tunity for profit to justify economically a succession fee without a
significant discount. That discount would of course be roughly equal
to the present value of the future income proscribed by S. 4071.
This nearly complete elimination of succession fees would indicate
that the unfair burden test would correspondingly prohibit the imposi-
tion of any such direct cost upon a fund in the sale transaction itself
and permit only those intangible burdens which might be associated
with the unsettling aspects of an adjustment to new management. A
narrower interpretation would leave the phrase essentially meaningless
since almost all of a succession fee paid to a retiring adviser, regardless
of its form, .would constitute a lost opportunity for a fund and would
have to be repaid eventually by shareholders through subsequent man-
agement fees or less extensive services.
4. Entrepreneurial Reward
The elimination of the bulk of post-sale entrepreneurial reward
profit streams raises two questions. Is payment of such reward solely
through management fees a viable business alternative? More funda-
mentally, is entrepreneurial reward a valid consideration in determin-
ing management fees?
Mutual fund sponsors should be rewarded for entrepreneurial
risk. Sponsors usually incur initial operating losses when establishing
a fund. They absorb the expenses shareholders would be forced to
shoulder if the fund were internally managed.248 By permitting these
248 The organization of an open-end investment company and the operation of it
until it earns its own way involves the expenditure of substantial sums of money,
running into many thousands of dollars. This money must be supplied by some-
one. It cannot be provided by the stockholders of the fund; most of it must be
spent before there are any public stockholders. Even with the proposed require-
ment of $100,000 initial capital, the organization and development, expense must
come from outside of the investment company itself, since no reputable distributor
would offer securities of a company whose initial balance sheet shows a large
capital defit--due to organization expenses. Such a security could not be quali-
fied under the "blue sky" laws of most States.
The expense of organization and development, therefore, is borne by the so-
called sponsors who expect to and usually do manage the company after it has
procured capital for investment. There is nothing nefarious about this; there is
not the slightest indication that people who organize open-end investment com-
panies are not qualified to manage them. On the contrary, organization-which
includes the distribution of securities--can be accomplished only by those in whose
management the public has ultimate confidence.
Hearings, supra note 188, at 587 (statement of Senator Long). Long went on to argue that
the statutory termination of all management contracts after two years did not permit these
losses to be recouped by "honest management." Id. He prophesized that the mandatory
short term would restrict the field to men "bent upon ... recovery.. . by ... dishonest
practices." Id. Long, like the drafters, apparently did not foresee the reluctance of fund
directors to seek new advisers.
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losses to be recouped in the profit margin in later years when the asset
base is broader, more shareholders share the out-of-pocket expenses of
their investment vehicle, and initial performance is not hindered by
large organizational expenses. In arguing for the payment of reward
for entrepreneurial risk William Nutt has reasoned:
The adviser typically sustains a loss when starting a new fund or
group of funds and must recoup these losses through its profit mar-
gin in later years. Although these losses cannot be considered after
they have been recouped, they can be an element of a reasonable
profit. Some advisers have created funds through an initial public
offering and almost immediately generated a net asset base sufficient
to assure a reasonable profit. If this technique becomes prevalent,
the independent directors should not reward an adviser who does
not or cannot employ these techniques, and who thus sustains
initial losses, by returning these losses in the form of a higher ad-
visory fee.249
Although Nutt properly expresses concern that entrepreneurial reward
not become a convenient rubric by which to justify unreasonable
fees, his analysis erroneously makes no allowance for the promotional
risk of failure an adviser takes and the ongoing risks of operation its
successor assumes. Instead, he limits his definition of entrepreneurial
risk to essentially promoter expenses. The entrepreneurial risk that
mutual fund sponsors bear, however, goes beyond initial operating
expenses. Sponsors are not assured income enough to provide a wage
commensurate with their efforts. They run the risk that their organiza-
tional and promotional efforts will not result in sufficient funds under
management ever adequately to reward their services. True, some of
this risk is properly borne by the sponsors; they should shoulder the
risk that their talents will not meet the demands of the industry. But
when these efforts are successful, shareholders are provided unique
investment vehicles not otherwise available, and are guaranteed that
regardless of sales resistance, massive redemptions, or market declines
they will not incur costs and expenses above a relatively low ceiling.250
For bearing these risks and developing funds, pioneering sponsors
should be rewarded by the fund shareholders.
Successors also assume some ongoing risks of operation, although
their undertakings are not as extensive as those of the original sponsors.
249 Nutt, supra note 47, at 245-46.
250 Many states impose annual expense limitations on mutual funds. Most permit
no more than 1.5% of net asset value to be used for all expenses, including brokerage,
taxes, transfer agency fees, and management compensation. Advisers must assume all costs
in excess of these limits. See Baron & Ellis, Mutual Fund Expense Limits, 4 Rav. SEc. REG.
881 (1971).
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For example, an adviser must bear the risk of general industry-wide
investor dissatisfaction or disinterest in mutual funds, with a conse-
quent reduction in sales and an increase in redemptions. Such dissatisfac-
tion may be caused by extraneous considerations, such as an economic
recession, rather than by poor performance. Although the amount re-
warded for these entrepreneurial risks would not equal that given the
pioneering principals, ongoing risks are an element of a reasonable
management fee.
Two arguments might be advanced in support of prohibiting any
reward for entrepreneurial risk. Drawing on the Rosenfeld case, a
plaintiff might argue that all entrepreneurial reward should be pro-
scribed since mutual fund boards have the power to discontinue the
advisory Telationship with the present adviser and either contract with
a new adviser or internalize management, two alternatives which would
probably result in lower management costs. Thus, any payment above
the cost of mere management is evidence of an adviser using its in-
fluence and control to profit at the expense of the fund.
Another argument can be based on the Act's proscription of cheap
stock. A disgruntled shareholder could argue that the denial of this
method of earning entrepreneurial reward was in fact intended to
outlaw all such profit. Since payment for more than mere management
indirectly accomplishes the same result, it is impliedly prohibited.
However, in the face of suggestions to require internalization of all
mutual fund management, Congress has twice permitted the external
management pattern to continue,2 51 perhaps in order to provide a
means to achieve such reward. Moreover, since the existence of external
management does shift the entrepreneurial risk often shared by share-
holders in other industries from mutual fund investors to advisers, the
decision of Congress to permit entrepreneurial reward is appropriate.
Thus, after the enactment of S. 4071 directors can properly consider
risk in their deliberations with respect to the size of management com-
pensation.
The removal of succession fees as a means to reward entrepreneurial
risk by S. 4071 will permit increased shareholder protection but will not
remove the financial incentive necessary for the creation of new mutual
funds or the continued management of established ones. Since succes-
sion fees can conceptually be considered capitalized entrepreneurial
risk profit streams within management fees, consideration of the efficacy
251 In 1940 and 1970 suggestions were made to require internalization of all invest-
ment companies. See Hearings, supra note 188, at 252-54 (remarks of D. Schenker, SEC
counsel); Rottenberg, supra note 17, at 10.
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of both methods of payment-management fees alone or management
and succession fees--can center solely on whether entrepreneurial re-
ward should be paid continually over the existence of a fund or only for
a finite period.
Each method has both advantages and disadvantages. Payment
throughout the existence of a fund will make possible postponement
of payment, potential beneficial tax consequences, equitable distribu-
tion of costs, and lubrication for adviser self-removal. When entre-
preneurial reward is paid without regard to a specific termination date
or occurrence, the amount rewarded each year to the sponsor can be
lower, since the payment of a succession fee will, both conceptually and
as a practical matter, complete the reward for the risks undertaken.
Although the amount of the succession fee will, of course, be repaid to
the successor by a fund, by paying a succession fee a successor in effect
finances the debt of a fund, permitting a longer payment schedule.
Payment of a portion of the total sponsor entrepreneurial reward
in the form of a succession fee may permit a fund to make a smaller
total outlay. The succession fee may be considered for tax purposes as
capital gain, especially when a transfer occurs in the form of a sale
of management company stock. To the extent total entrepreneurial
reward is taxed at capital gain rates instead of higher ordinary income
rates, a fund will be able to make a smaller total outlay without a
sponsor receiving less after-tax dollars.
Continual payment would also mean that every shareholder would
share the cost and risk of organization and tenure regardless of when
he purchased or sold his shares. A reward scheme that terminated en-
trepreneurial profit at some specific point in time would, on the other
hand, permit subsequent shareholders to use the investment vehicle
without assuming any of its start-up costs, and, consequently, would re-
quire the initial shareholders to shoulder the entire burden.
Finally, advisers that should retire would do so more readily if
they could receive a succession fee. Directors are more likely to be
alerted by an adviser about the possibility of a change when that ad-
viser knows it will be able to receive a succession fee upon its de-
parture.
Some of these advantages depend on succession fees being received
by outgoing advisers. It is conceivable that an entrepreneurial reward
profit stream could be retained over the life of a fund while succession
fees are banned, but a total prohibition against succession fees in such
an instance would result in windfalls to successors. They would re-
ceive compensation reflecting an assumption of risk which they had not
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undertaken, either in the form of capital or effort. Moreover, unless
the management fee rate was gauged to reward a sponsor adequately
during its tenure, the sponsor would never be fully recompensed for its
efforts. In contrast, a higher rate set to reward a sponsor completely
would force a fund to pay at least twice for its creation. In sum, a total
ban of succession fees coupled with continuous payment would produce
anomalous results while providing only the continual payment advan-
tages of equitable cost distribution and, in the case of lower fees, post-
ponement of payment. Possible beneficial tax treatment of entrepre-
neurial reward and the stimulus for adviser self-removal would not be
available.
A second alternative to continual payment and succession fees
paid to sponsors might be to have succession fees paid to funds rather
than to retiring advisers. This, of course, is the result mandated by
Rosenfeld. This method would retain two of the advantages outlined
above, but it would remove the economic carrot for self-removal. More-
over, the payment of a succession fee at the largely fortuitous moment of
succession would distribute the promotional costs inequitably be-
tween investors. Only those who were shareholders at the time a change
of management took place would receive the benefit of the payment;
shareholders who redeemed prior to that instant or who purchased
their interests after succession would not have the net asset value of
their shares similarly enlarged. Finally, this alternative would require
the guesswork of financial appraisal to allocate the ex-fund going con-
cern value and worth of the net assets to the sellers and the succession
fee to the fund. This allocation process is unavoidable in cases where
succession fees have already been paid; from a prospective viewpoint,
however, a method which avoids this guesswork should be preferred. As
the drafters of the proposed legislation recognized, a system in which
natural market factors allocate these components to the proper recipi-
ents is preferable. In many other respects, this alternative is quite
similar in economic effect to payment of entrepreneurial reward for a
definite period, because the original sponsor would be the primary
recipient of entrepreneurial reward and would be fully recompensed
through the advisory fee structure upon its departure. Nevertheless,
these drawbacks eliminate this alternative.
The primary advantage that payment of entrepreneurial reward for
a definite period would provide is the one which so heavily influenced
the Rosenfeld court: no conflicts of interest would exist between a retir-
ing adviser and a fund in the choice of a successor. True, a conflict of
interest would exist as to the desirability of seeking a successor, but
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that conflict would exist under any payment method, since discontinu-
ation of an advisory relationship for poor performance or inadequate
services is a risk all advisers must take. Even under a continual pay-
ment plan in which an adviser would be permitted to receive a suc-
cession fee when it retires on its own initiative, it would be improper
for a board to require the successor of its choice to pay a succession fee
to a deposed sponsor which had to be replaced by the board for fail-
ure to provide adequate management services.
The absence of succession fees might, as a prospective matter,
produce more dedicated mutual fund advisers. Promotors who would
organize a fund in order to sell quickly their management company
stock for a profit would be deterred. Only investment advisers that
desired to enter long term advisory relationships would organize mu-
tual funds.
The amount paid as entrepreneurial reward in such a method
would more likely be commensurate with the benefits shareholders
derive from fund organization rather than with the sponsor's promo-
tional success. When a management fee component is paid as a percen-
tage of assets in the formative years, only the organizational success
of a fund is used as a measure, not later fund growth which produces
little, if any, material benefit to pre-existing shareholders. To the ex-
tent that reward is based on benefits derived by fund shareholders in-
stead of the value of the opportunity to a successor, the total reward
reflects its justification for existence.
There are three ways in which entrepreneurial reward could be
paid for a limited term. First, payment might be made for the tenure
of an original sponsor, however unpredictable that tenure may be.
Second, a specific term of years could be prescribed. Finally, these two
methods could be combined. The initial difficulty of a preset term of
years would be the determination of the appropriate length of the pay-
ment period. However, under any compensation method similar diffi-
cult decisions must be made with regard to the compensation rate.
The value of the assumption of risk is generally conceptualized as a
percentage of investment (of either capital or effort). Theoretically it
is incapable of finite quantification. The determination of a payment
term and a compensation rate are two aspects of the same problem.
The determination of an appropriate period would pose no new diffi-
culties. Ideally, both these figures would be preset at the inception of a
fund in order to provide advisers with incentive goals. This is the time,
unfortunately, when unaffiliated members of a board are most subject
to influence from an adviser, both because they have been selected by
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it and because the joint interests they share in successfully launching a
fund tend to obscure the acute conflicts of interest inherent in such a
determination. Thus, if a period of years is used, the term should not be
rigidly fixed until after several years of operation.
Additional problems arise upon termination of an advisory re-
lationship prior to the expiration of the payment term. Unless the
profit stream were to be discontinued at either the termination of the
relationship or the completion of the term, a successor would receive
an inflated management fee. In the case of voluntary withdrawal by
the sponsor, payment of a succession fee would produce the undesirable
conflicts of interest which accompany bargaining for the highest
price.
Payment for the tenure of the founding sponsor would obviate
these objections. No succession fee would be present to jeopardize the
selection of a successor, and an immediate reduction in advisory fees
would reward a successor appropriately for its services and commit-
ment.2
52
A limited time span method with payment extending no longer
than the tenure of the initial sponsor, like the one produced by S. 4071,
is the best method to reward entrepreneurial risk. By removing the con-
flicts of interest that succession fees produce, the protection of investors
would be improved. In addition, the development of truly autonomous
boards would be advanced, improving the advisory relationship. This,
in turn, should ensure higher quality successor advisers and ultimately
increased investor confidence in the mutual fund form of investment.
If succession fees were absolutely necessary to provide entrepreneurial
reward, their presence would be justifiable because entrepreneurial
reward is essential to provide incentives for the continued creation of
these useful investment vehicles. Fortunately, however, entrepreneurial
reward can be adequately included in the annual management com-.
pensation.
252 It might be suggested that in combination with a term of years, this method
could remove some of the unwillingness of mediocre or otherwise undesirable advisers to
permit discontinuation of the relationship. The expiration of the predetermined period
and consequent diminution in the management fee rate might remove this impediment.
However, it should be remembered that if no opportunities existed elsewhere, a controlling
shareholder might desire to remain in office in order to continue to receive a fair wage for
his services. This is still permitted, even with internalized management fee rates, and is
considered by all courts to be a permissible emolument of control. See Bayne, The Non-
investment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND. L.J. 317 (1970); Bayne, The Investment Value
of Control Stock, 54 MINN. L. Rav. 1265, 1269-88 (1970). Thus, the disincentive to leave
the relationship would be only reduced, not eliminated, by payment for a present term.
Moreover, any reduction in disincentive would not redound to the benefit of the fund
until the term is completed.
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Admittedly, there are disadvantages to this form of payment.
First, the entire amount of entrepreneurial reward will be taxed to
advisers at ordinary rates. But with the total limited to a finite term,
the overall outlay may be less, despite the less advantageous tax con-
sequences, because successors need not be paid for financing a sub-
stantial portion of the total. Second, there would be no economic
inducement to entice successors to retire voluntarily. This disadvan-
tage might be offset, however, by the development of a new breed of
mutual fund advisers which are content to earn their entrepreneurial
rewards through long term, dedicated portfolio management. The
most serious drawback would be the unequal distribution of costs be-
tween shareholders. Those investors who joined a fund after the retire-
ment of the original adviser would escape the costs of promotion and
development. The original shareholders would shoulder the entire ex-
pense. This more burdensome treatment of the initial shareholders,
however, would be somewhat ameliorated by the reduced likelihood
that their chosen investment adviser would retire, disappointing their
investment expectations. Of course, when the relationship is severed,
the likelihood of securing a high quality successor is greatly enhanced.
D. Summary
S. 4071 will be a valuable addition to the 1940 Act, since it codifies
the Rosenfeld principle that an advisory relationship is not an asset of
an adviser. The analysis of its method for payment of entrepreneurial
reward offered here suggests that should it be enacted, courts would
further its purpose by interpreting its provisions as follows:
(1) "Unfair burden" should be defined to encompass any pay-
ment for the value of an advisory position with a fund.
(2) The express approval of the receipt of "any amount or
benefit" should be held to permit only a fair compensation for a re-
tiring adviser's assets, including ex-fund going concern value, and
not to allow payment for its use of influence or for the value of an
advisory relationship.
These two interpretations are the only ones which are consistent
with elimination of succession fees through proscription of post-sale
board consideration of the price paid to retiring advisers.
CONCLUSION
Reward for entrepreneurial risk is essential to promote the con-
tinued establishment of new mutual funds-useful investment vehi-
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des for small investors. Succession fees, despite their long use as one
source of entrepreneurial reward, pose too great a threat to investor
expectations of high quality portfolio management and low costs.
Whenever advisers or their shareholders are permitted to capitalize on
a mutual fund advisory relationship, they necessarily increase the cost
and may endanger the quality of future investment management.
Fortunately, another avenue for reward for entrepreneurial risk
remains as a viable alternative. Advisory fees can and should contain
an element specifically designated for such reward. Payment of a segre-
gated portion of periodic management fee rates preserves promoter in-
centive, yet contains few dangers to management quality. Possible
abuse does lie in determination of a reasonable amount of reward.
This danger, however, is a creature of the conflicts of interest inherent
in the industry-wide external management form of organization. In-
dependent directors, significantly aided by an incremental evaluation
of management compensation, and S. 4071, providing possibilities for
Self-perpetuation and numerical control of proxy machinery, should
be able to restore much of the balance of bargaining power which the
Act envisions and which is necessary if funds are to guard against the
adviser's self-interested dominance.
Rosenfeld correctly saw the hazards of selection and the undis-
closed costs succession fees necessarily inflict on mutual fund share-
holders. Its holding was a significant step toward purging advisory re-
lationships of those dangers. But judicial decisions must deal with
the particular facts at hand and can give only partial answers to broad-
ranging questions. In retrospect, Rosenfeld's chief contribution, due in
large part to its unusual factual setting, may lie in bringing widespread
attention to the problem. The naked sale of Lazard's position presented
a court for the first time with a clearly isolated succession fee and
permitted exposure of its makeup and rationale.
Legislation can deal more comprehensively with a multifaceted
problem such as this one. The thrust of S. 4071 offers a promising and
constructive solution. Principally independent boards of directors and
an immediate elimination of most of an entrepreneurial reward man-
agement fee component upon the initial statutory assignment of a fund's
advisory contract provide novel, yet necessary, means to guard against
unreasonable adviser profits and undesirable successors while providing
entrepreneurial incentive. Several additional amendments to the Act
are needed, however, to permit the bill to meet this goal more readily.
S. 4071, including the minor alterations proposed herein, should be
given serious congressional consideration.
